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This research analyzes the ongoing effort by Uber’s executives to prevent the 
reclassification of the company’s drivers from independent contractors to employees. Through 
rhetorical appeals made to customers, regulatory bodies, and drivers themselves, Uber’s 
executives are attempting to cultivate a corporate identity that portrays the company’s labor 
practices in a way that adheres to California’s labor laws, namely the “ABC” test for worker 
classification codified in Assembly Bill 5, while maintaining the company’s ill-gotten reputation 
as a bastion of Silicon Valley innovation. The success of this posturing hinges on attempts to 
conflate Uber’s labor practices with equitable social outcomes, publicize narratives that 
overemphasize and mischaracterize the benefits of flexible work schedules, and co-opt 
consumerist terminology in its description of drivers’ relation to the company. This piece 
embarks upon a critical analysis of these strategies, comparing the claims made in public-facing 
corporate rhetoric with the actual power dynamics that exist between the company and its 
drivers. If these strategies ultimately prove successful, they may provide a blueprint for future 
anti-reclassification campaigns waged by Uber throughout the United States. Regardless of 
whether AB5’s "ABC" test finds Uber’s drivers to be employees or independent contractors, the 
decision will be reached with incomplete knowledge of the algorithms that govern driver 
workflows, which are shielded from the public and regulators alike by intellectual property law. 
To remedy this uncertainty, I argue for the empowerment of municipal governments to regulate 
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Uber’s operations within their jurisdictions and for regulatory oversight over algorithms that 
administer systems of labor. 
3. Introduction 
Through a combination of aggressive expansion afforded by wildly successful venture 
capital funding, centrally orchestrated regulatory arbitrage and digitized systems of labor 
administration, Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) have muscled their way into 
ubiquity in terms of urban transportation. In virtually every major metro region in the US, these 
companies have largely supplanted traditional taxi services, neglecting traditional industry 
standards of service quality in the interest of maximizing customer convenience and economic 
growth. In the pursuit of these aims, TNCs have relied upon and in the process popularized a 
newfangled and considerably precarious form of employment commonly known as “gig work,” a 
system that the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines as one in which workers are classified as 
independent contractors and are connected to customers through a mobile app. It is important to 
note that temporary and contingent work have been staples of the United States’ job market for 
centuries, as many professions including musicians, writers and carpenters have long operated 
under such arrangements. “Gig work” as it is discussed in this research, however, refers to the 
refinement and expansion of these arrangements by infusing them with new technology that 
manages and administers labor through a mobile app. 
The potentially nefarious and exploitative aspects of such a system have been obscured 
from the public and regulators alike through TNCs’ deliberate fashioning of favorable corporate 
identities. These identities are primarily based upon the perceived inherent beneficence of 
technological innovation and automation when applied to systems of employment, a belief that 
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has held up against criticism until very recently (Hasinoff and Levina 2017). The research will 
examine the case of Uber, which is the largest and highest-profile TNC, and its ongoing 
multi-front campaign against the regulation of its labor practices via the reclassification of its 
independently contracted drivers. Uber’s history of fighting these regulations, as well as the 
specific tactics and strategies it has developed and employed to do so, exemplify the​ ​issues that 
arise when, in a matter of a few years, a company becomes so financially powerful and 
entrenched in the daily lives of millions of people that attempts at substantively reforming its 
practices are met with stifling opposition.  
From Uber’s inception, its growth plan has been deliberately based upon bad faith 
interpretations and at times outright defiance of laws that stand to endanger all parties involved, 
with the exception of the corporate entity itself (Edelman 2017). Especially vulnerable in this 
system are Uber’s drivers, who are denied many of the traditional protections and benefits of 
employment due to their status as independent contractors despite the considerable measure of 
control that the company enjoys over many aspects of their work. To be sure, the efficacy of 
certain aspects of Uber’s business model, namely the regular slashing of prices in efforts to 
undercut competition and create “platform monopolies,” have been called into question by 
detractors and allies alike (Rushkoff 2016, 92; Edelman 2017). However, the system of worker 
administration determined by algorithm and delivered by an app that Uber has popularized is 
becoming increasingly prevalent. Algorithms are defined as mathematical models that consist of 
“​a finite series of ​well-defined​, computer-implementable instructions to solve a specific set of 
computable problems” (Math Vault, n.d.). In Uber’s case, algorithms determine virtually all 
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aspects of its drivers’ workflow, from fare rates to route suggestions, all with the intent of 
maximizing efficiency and customer convenience.  
Many types of freelance work - from digitally-based services like graphic and web design 
to manual labor like home repairs and moving services -  are increasingly orchestrated through 
algorithmically-enabled, app-based services like TaskRabbit and Fiverr. Even many white collar 
professions, particularly in the education and legal fields, are increasingly governed and 
influenced by labor-facing algorithms (O’Neil 2016, 4). The common collective term used to 
reference the growing number of economic actors that center their business models on app-based 
service provision from independently contracted workers is “the Gig Economy,” of which TNCs 
are a notable and foundational component. Corporations across industry lines find such a system 
desirable chiefly because it cuts labor costs through its misclassification of workers and 
performing the typical duties of management via algorithm rather than a human worker. The 
misrepresentation of the company’s workforce and the nature of the worker-corporation 
relationship, which has been achieved by the company’s effective utilization of corporate 
identity creation, has for years assuaged the concerns of all but the most attentive and 
empowered regulatory bodies.  
This trend seems to have reversed, or at least halted, in the last two years, as judges and 
legislators around the US have begun pursuing means by which to curb TNC worker 
misclassification. California provides a prime example of such a shift in regulatory emphasis, as 
lawmakers’ recent legislative attempts at reining in TNCs’ labor practices have been both drastic 
and largely successful. This ongoing campaign has its roots in the California Supreme Court’s 
decision in ​Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (Dynamex), ​a case 
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wherein the state-recognized definition of independent work was drastically altered.​ ​The 
Dynamex ​case, decided in April 2018,  revolves around a man named Charles Lee, who worked 
as a delivery driver for Dynamex, a company that specializes in same-day delivery and pickup 
services for both businesses and the public (Kim 2018). Lee, believing that his work for 
Dynamex was not truly independent, filed a misclassification claim against the firm alleging that 
its actions amounted to unfair and illegal labor practices (Kim 2018). Not only did the California 
Supreme Court side with Lee on this issue, it also redefined the standards by which ​all ​workers 
are to be classified in California by refining the “ABC” test for employment first established in 
the 1989 case ​S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.  Department of Industrial Relations (Borello) ​(Kim 
2018)​.​ ​Dynamex ​specified the “ABC” test’s definition of independent contract work, thus 
making it more uniformly enforceable, by eliminating subjective phrasing that had long plagued 
the efficacy of the test established by ​Borello ​(Vega 2018)​.​ The refined “ABC” test established 
in ​Dynamex​ includes the following three conditions:  
A: The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the 
performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact. 
 
B: The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business 
C: The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed. 
While the​ Dynamex ​decision streamlined and simplified worker classification in 
California, the manner in which it accomplished this goal - building upon and revising previous 
caselaw - meant that certain obstacles to proper and uniform enforcement of the “ABC” test 
remained in place. Though the California Supreme Court has “steadily adapted the test to capture 
a true employment relationship as business models, such as the use of staffing agencies and 
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contractors, have changed,” the fact that each subsequent change must come from a separate 
worker misclassification case makes solely relying on the courts an inherently reactive mode of 
regulation (Vega 2018). Further, the fact that these foundational decisions are subject to the 
discretion of individual judges replete with their own beliefs, interpretations and biases tasked 
with analyzing unique and often complex employment situations makes the uniform enforcement 
of these standards unlikely if not impossible.  
To mitigate the enforcement limitations inherent in the previous court-led regulatory 
efforts, an effort to codify the refined “ABC” test established by ​Dynamex ​into law through 
legislative means was launched in late 2018. This effort was spearheaded by State 
Assemblymember Lorena Gonzalez, who authored, introduced and championed 2019’s 
Assembly Bill 5 (AB5), a piece of legislation that would codify the ​Dynamex ​“ABC” test while 
simultaneously affording new oversight capabilities to the state’s four largest municipalities. 
Though Gonzalez herself positioned AB5 as a bill aiming to curb the labor practices of TNCs 
specifically, a characterization that was adopted by many of the media outlets that covered this 
bill, its provisions stood to impact an array of California’s largest and most prominent industries 
including trucking, entertainment and technology (Bhuiyan et al, 2019). The widely inclusive 
nature of AB5’s provisions proved controversial, as numerous populations of freelancers and 
independent contract workers - along with pro-business organizations, chambers of commerce 
and TNCs - throughout the state vehemently opposed the legislation’s passage and bargained 
tirelessly for exemptions from its provisions (Roosevelt and Faughnder 2019). Ultimately, AB5 
passed both houses of the California Legislature and was signed into law by Governor Gavin 
Newsom on September 18, 2019 with many classifications of workers including lawyers, real 
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estate agents, barbers and freelance writers receiving exemptions from AB5’s “ABC” test but 
remaining subject to the less strict test established by ​Borello ​(Fishman 2019)​.  
TNCs, with Uber chief among them, remain the most prominent and visible opponents to 
AB5 and remain committed to either achieving exemptions for their drivers or overturning AB5 
altogether. The fact that this ongoing battle is taking place in California - which is not only Uber 
and many other TNCs’ home state but one of their main revenue producing markets - raises the 
stakes even higher (Griswold 2019). Uber and its fellow TNCs’ response to AB5’s passage has 
reflected the high stakes nature of the law - as they’ve spent tens of million of dollars on multiple 
legal, technological and rhetorical anti-regulatory strategies and tactics in the few short months 
since its passage. 
In the process of opposing AB5’s passage as well as the law’s applicability to its drivers, 
Uber has fashioned its corporate identity in a number of confounding, contradictory and 
problematic ways. The aim of this research is to clearly define and analyze the problematic 
aspects of Uber’s carefully crafted and uniquely adaptable corporate identity as well as its labor 
classification practices that’ve been the basis of its efforts to avoid meaningful regulation. This 
exercise is intended to shed light on the pitfalls of unchecked techno-positivism when applied to 
systems that determine the material well-being of workers. The techno-positivist ethos, which 
was predominant among not only Silicon Valley’s intelligentsia but the American populace as a 
whole during Uber’s rise to prominence, is defined as the belief that unencumbered technological 
innovation will inherently produce increasingly favorable social and economic outcomes on both 
individual and societal levels (Morozov 2013, 6). In attempting to resituate the conversation 
about Uber and app-based employment in general, the goal of this research is to empower 
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workers and regulators alike to more openly and effectively question corporations’ attempts at 
self-mythologization and mystification of their proprietary technologies to secure competitive 
advantages. If left unexamined, the beliefs and assumptions that Uber promotes about its labor 
practices will likely continue to harm workers, tie regulators’ hands and pacify public opinion. 
This capstone project intends to hold these very beliefs and assumptions under scrutiny 
by asking the following question: How does Uber’s corporate identity inform and shape its 
attempts at preventing the significant regulation of its labor practices? Specifically, how is Uber 
cultivating and utilizing its corporate identity in its ongoing campaign to exempt its drivers from 
the provisions of California’s Assembly Bill 5? Beginning to demystify these tactics benefits not 
only the regulatory bodies charged with objectively enforcing relevant laws upon Uber’s labor 
practices, but also the public at large, who exert influence over these structures through both 
their consumption choices and their decisions in the voting booth. This issue reaches far beyond 
guiding consumption choices or assisting in the important work of government regulators, 
however. Understanding the economic and social stakes of TNC driver classification in clear 
terms unfettered by Uber’s own rosy rhetoric and overly-simplistic, self-serving arguments is the 
first step toward creating a system that works to the benefit of the millions of people who work 
within these structures. To understand the terms of this issue outside of the biased 
self-characterizations of Uber and its fellow TNCs, we must first identify, dissect and analyze 
these questionable and at times fraudulent characterizations themselves. 
In response to the aforementioned research question, I argue that Uber has attempted to 
prevent regulation of its labor practices largely through its deliberate creation of a corporate 
identity that paints its business practices as far more progressive, equitable and ultimately 
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pro-worker (or at the very least sufficiently objective toward them) than reality might reveal. 
Uber’s corporate identity is intentionally amorphous and dependent on the goal the company is 
attempting to achieve at a given time. When attempting to avoid the regulation of its labor 
practices, as it has done countless times throughout its history but most notably in the last year 
against California’s Assembly Bill 5, Uber fosters its identity through the weaponization of 
driver and rider reliance on the company’s services, publicizing narratives that overemphasize 
drivers’ alleged desire for schedule flexibility, and co-opting consumerist terminology in its 
description of drivers and their relation to the company. Additionally, Uber has sought to 
obfuscate the nature of its labor practices in the immediate wake of AB5’s passage through 
multiple, contradictory anti-regulatory approaches including claims that the new law’s “ABC” 
test for employment does not apply to the company and dedicating $30 million toward a ballot 
initiative that would exempt the company from AB5’s provisions.  
This argument is significant because it demonstrates Uber’s tendency to effectively 
winnow down what are truly complex, multifaceted issues into solely the terms that paint its 
business practices in the most benign light possible. By drawing attention to the key role the 
company’s services play in many urban transportation networks, many drivers’ desire for 
schedule flexibility and the company’s self-identification as a technology company rather than a 
taxi company, Uber’s corporate rhetoric serves to obfuscate and diminish the many other 
implications and impacts the company’s practices have on its drivers and society at large. The 
issue of driver classification alone, which is the primary concern of this research, impacts a wide 
range of policy areas including public safety, labor rights, corporate tax law and transportation 
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regulation. To engage with driver classification on Uber’s terms, however, is to view it primarily 
through the lens of rider convenience, systemic efficiency and schedule flexibility.  
In order to fully explore the relationship between Uber’s corporate identity and its 
attempts at avoiding the regulation of its labor practices, I will first discuss the economic 
conditions and technological innovations that allowed the TNCs’ emergence, fostered their initial 
growth and shaped their collective rhetorical ethos. I will then discuss the experiences that have 
led me to focus my capstone research on Uber’s corporate identity and shaped my understanding 
of the Gig Economy as a whole. To do so, I will reflect upon my past involvement with other 
research on the Gig Economy by recounting my experiences as an intern with Jobs with Justice 
San Francisco, a local labor advocacy organization. While my experiences at Jobs with Justice 
San Francisco and in the University of San Francisco’s Urban and Public Affairs program 
exposed me to a small portion of the research being conducted on the Gig Economy’ labor 
implications, the complete array of past research that informs and influences my capstone is 
rather expansive. A exploration of this body of research, as well as justification for how my 
research findings complement and augment it, can be found in the literature review portion of 
this capstone. Before delving into my research findings, I will outline the methods by which I 
conducted my original research, the reasoning behind such methodological choices, and the 
limitations that employing such methods entails. 
The findings and analysis portion of this capstone contains four requisite sections. The 
first, an analysis of Uber’s history of conflating its efficiency-seeking ethos with progressive 
ideals and the company’s continued weaponization of riders’ dependence on its services, aims to 
expose Uber’s proclivity to oversimplify and mischaracterize the implications and impacts of its 
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labor practices. What follows is an in-depth case study of Uber’s multi-faceted and ongoing 
campaign in opposition to AB5’s passage and application to its California-based drivers. This 
portion of my findings sheds light on the ways in which Uber deliberately centers or 
marginalizes the voices and experiences of its drivers depending on what is most beneficial to its 
interests in a given circumstance. Third, I discuss the messaging surrounding the company’s 
most recent attempt at circumventing AB5’s provisions, the “Protect App Based Drivers and 
Services Act,” which is a 2020 California ballot initiative sponsored by Uber and fellow TNCs. 
This portion of my findings points to the vast differences that exist between Uber’s standard 
corporate identity and the messaging included in the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” 
campaign, ultimately arguing that this dichotomy diminishes the efficacy and authenticity of 
both strands of identity. Finally, I discuss Uber’s tactic of co-opting consumerist rhetoric in its 
public-facing descriptions of its drivers and communications made to drivers themselves, an 
attempt at highlighting the subtlety with which companies like Uber can popularize fraudulent 
narratives about their business and labor practices.  
The final portions of this capstone focus on explaining the significance of my findings 
and recommending policies that could address the issue of TNC worker misclassification. The 
significance of my research lies in the fact that algorithmic management of labor is becoming 
increasingly prevalent across industry lines. This fact, coupled with the pending success of 
Uber’s strategy to combat driver reclassification, points to the possibility of it being co-opted by 
other companies engaging in similar pursuits. Finally, the conclusion of this capstone includes a 
summary of my findings as well as policy recommendations that call for more robust regulatory 
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capabilities for municipal governments in California as well as government-led regulation of 
algorithms that govern systems of labor.  
 
Historical Background: The Great Recession and The Rise of the Gig Economy 
No analysis of Uber’s rise, or that of the Gig Economy as a whole, is complete without an 
account of the wider economic and sociological conditions in which this phenomenon occurred. 
The embrace of such an untested and novel system of commerce in such a rapid fashion was a 
response to a notable societal shift with technological, economic and social elements. On a 
foundational level, the Gig Economy’s precipitous rise could not have taken place were it not for 
a handful of key technological innovations that occurred over the latter half of the 2000’s.  
Specifically, this period of innovative change hinged on four separate but related 
innovations, the first of which was the launch of Amazon Web Services, or AWS, in 2006. AWS 
is a cloud-based computing platform and application programming interface that allows 
entrepreneurs and developers to build and host their software programs without owning and 
operating the infrastructure that this process necessitates (Amazon, n.d.). In other words, AWS 
significantly lowered the barriers to entry for software developers hoping to launch their own 
startup business by allowing access to Amazon’s infrastructure on a subscription basis, which 
was considerably cheaper than what would be necessary for fledgling businesses to do so on 
their own. The second seminal technological breakthrough was the debut of the Apple iPhone in 
2007 (Apple, 2007). While it was nowhere near the first smartphone to hit the market, its 
introduction and immediate popularity marked a societal inflection point in which truly mobile 
internet access would become ubiquitous to modern life. It was Apple’s unveiling of its App 
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Store the following year, however, that truly unlocked the full potential of the smartphone for 
both software developers and consumers alike (Apple, 2008). The App Store essentially serves 
as a digital intermediary on which iPhone users can purchase and download mobile program 
applications, or “apps,”  many of which are designed and hosted via AWS. These three 
technologies facilitate the creation, maintenance and distribution of cutting edge software in a 
manner that is not only cheaper and faster than traditional computing, but completely mobile as 
well. Coupled with the ongoing sophistication of GPS technologies that led to their compatibility 
with smartphones around the same time, the technical underpinnings for an app like Uber to be 
created were firmly in place. 
While the aforementioned advancements may have provided the technological capacity 
necessary for companies like Uber, AirBNB and Postmates to exist and flourish, their existence 
alone does not explain their eventual reimagining into tools through which to administer work. 
For such an explanation to be made, one must consider the economic conditions of the time, 
which were defined by the Great Recession. In broad terms, the Great Recession was a period of 
about eighteen months in which a collapse of the US’ housing market - which itself was caused 
by the proliferation of subprime mortgage lending and the utilization of overly speculative 
financial instruments - precipitated a worldwide economic downturn with myriad impacts in 
different locales. Though the Recession was deemed officially over in mid-2009, its impacts 
continue to be felt, primarily amongst society's most vulnerable populations. During this period, 
the US’ unemployment rate ballooned to 10% and did not return to pre-recession levels until 
2016 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). Further, the total value of homes in the US fell by 
30%, as millions of homes with subprime mortgages were foreclosed upon and the total wealth 
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held by US households fell by a staggering $14 trillion (McManus 2010). Notably but perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the US’ Black and Latinx populations felt the brunt of this crash, as they were the 
primary targets of the very speculative lending practices that caused the Recession (Massey and 
Rugh 2010, 629). Such dire economic circumstances, which are not even fully encapsulated by 
most commonly-cited metrics, are highly likely to incentivize those impacted to pursue the type 
of easily-accessible, temporal income sources that the Gig Economy would come to provide 
around this time.  
Aside from the Recession’s economic effects, it also deeply impacted the American 
psyche. Sociologist Jennie E. Brand has found that unemployment fosters unsavory 
psychological byproducts including a “loss of trust in society” as well as rising levels of clinical 
depression and general feelings of shame amongst those impacted (Brand 2016, 359-375). Such 
feelings were likely held by a rather wide swath of the populace, as a 2010 Pew Research study 
found that ½ of all adults in the job market lost jobs or income during the Recession, implying a 
much wider psychological impact than official unemployment statistics alone would indicate 
(Pew Research, 2010). 
During this period, a number of institutions considered to be part of the nation’s 
economic bedrock - namely automobile manufacturers and banking institutions - approached or 
reached financial insolvency. Such a rapid and jarring decline coupled with the aforementioned 
economic and psychological stressors of rising unemployment and declining household wealth 
likely compounded the crisis of trust noted in Brand’s research. To be sure, some of these 
institutions sowed the seeds of their own demise, as they were the very actors whose actions 
caused the subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent dismantling of the American housing 
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market. Rather than being able to take solace in the fact that those responsible for wreaking such 
destruction would face at least some sort of consequence, in this case bankruptcy, the American 
working and middle classes were likely further disillusioned by the Federal Government's 
relatively weak, mistargeted and ineffectual efforts to guide an recovery from this human-made 
disaster. 
Such efforts began with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, more 
commonly known as the “Bank Bailout of 2008,” which provided direct relief for some of the 
Recession’s largest and most culpable perpetrators including financial giants like Citigroup and 
Wells Fargo (Collins 2015; “Bailed Out Banks”). Perhaps the most egregious aspect of this 
legislation was its purchase of $700 billion worth of illiquid or “toxic” mortgages held by banks 
in efforts to minimize the banks’ losses from the mortgages’ devaluation. Though the exact 
amount that this bailout cost taxpayers in full is unclear, estimates of the Federal Government’s 
total commitment reach as high as $16.8 trillion (Collins 2015). The logic behind this decision 
was illuminated by then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernake’s “too big to fail” theory, 
which posits that firms “​whose size, complexity, interconnectedness, and critical functions are 
such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, the rest of the financial system and 
the economy would face severe adverse consequences” (Bernake 2010). Though the logic of 
Bernake’s sentiment is likely based on the fact that the global economy has become increasingly 
dependent on the finance sector over the past half century, the message such a theory sends to 
non-elite audiences is one of utter disregard and indifference. If the banks were considered “too 




Critiques of the 2008 bank bailout were widespread, as many argued that providing 
economic assistance to the Recession’s victims would have been more moral and equitable use 
of the funds that the bailout bill dedicated to buying banks’ toxic mortgage assets. Two 
subsequent bills passed during the Obama Administration - the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 - sought to offset what had until that time been a thoroughly insufficient 
and tone deaf recovery effort by directing their programs toward the protection of the American 
working and middle classes. While the ARRA provided funding for a broad array of programs 
aimed at stimulating multiple sectors of the US’ economy, its total expenditure of $831 billion 
was widely seen as insufficient with respect to the goals it set out to accomplish (Congressional 
Budget Office 2012; Ried 2012, Table 1). The Dodd-Frank Act was geared toward preventing 
future recessions by r​eforming the financial services and banking industries through additional 
federal oversight powers and banning certain kinds of overly speculative investments (Koba 
2012). Thus, the immediate impact of Dodd-Frank as it pertained to the US middle and working 
classes was purely psychological - a sort of vague reassurance that there wouldn’t be a repeat of 
the Great Recession. 
Their seemingly positive intentions notwithstanding, this slate of reforms was largely 
insufficient as it did not adequately restore the material well-being of the US’ working and 
middle classes back to pre-recession levels. This created a vacuum which private companies, and 
tech companies in particular, began to fill by providing ways for people still feeling the lingering 
impacts of the Recession to supplement their income in novel ways. The primary manifestation 
of this response to the new economic reality was the Gig Economy, which allowed people to 
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monetize things they already owned like their car, their home, their skills and their free time 
through a digitally-mediated marketplace (Hogan and Torpey 2016). This novel arrangement was 
well-tailored to thrive in the immediate post-recession economy that saw a rather slow decline in 
unemployment after its peak. In fact, by the time that Uber launched its peer-to-peer ridesharing 
service UberX in April 2013, the national unemployment rate remained at 7.6%, three percentage 
points higher than pre-recession levels (Kalanick 2013; US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020).  
Thus, we can triangulate the causes of the Gig Economy’s rise and current economic 
function not as some passing fad or novel experiment, but through the lens of the technological 
innovations that allowed its existence and the economic disaster that prompted its widespread 
utilization. 
 
Internship Reflection: Jobs with Justice San Francisco 
My academic interest in the Gig Economy began when I participated in a research project 
that was being conducted by the City and County of San Francisco’s Local Agency Formation 
Committee (LAFCo) during the Spring and Summer of 2019. My first involvement in this 
project was as a student in Urban and Public Affairs’ Research Methods class, wherein our 
semester-long group assignment was to design and conduct pre-research on the topics LAFCo 
was focusing its wider research project on. The class was divided into four groups, each with its 
own topic to focus on: the impacts of TNCs’ labor practices on drivers, TNCs’ political and 
lobbying activity, the geographic and logistical considerations of these companies’ operations 
and best practices in terms of regulating TNCs. I chose to participate in the labor portion of this 
project, as it most closely aligned with my interest in studying the intersection of organized 
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labor, labor policy and the technology industry, which I had made the focus of many of my 
previous assignments in the Urban and Public Affairs program. My pre-research group’s work 
consisted of two types of qualitative inquiry, in-person interviews and a digitally-administered 
survey, which were aimed toward gauging workers’ experiences and opinions on working as a 
TNC driver. These efforts marked my first exposure to the realities of working in the Gig 
Economy as they are experienced by gig workers themselves, an experience that grounded my 
understanding of the contemporary labor market and exposed me to the complicated dynamics 
that exist between gig workers and their partner TNCs. However, the constrained timeline of this 
project and the limited resources at our disposal prohibited our pre-research from reaching the 
depth and detail that my classmates and I would’ve liked. 
Luckily, through my summer internship at Jobs with Justice San Francisco, I had the 
opportunity to participate in the larger research project that my class’ pre-research had 
contributed to and informed. Jobs with Justice San Francisco is a nonprofit organization that 
convenes a coalition of over 30 local community and labor organizations around the goal of 
building a strong, progressive movement for economic and social justice locally and nationally. 
Due to its extensive connections to local networks of workers, advocates and working class 
communities in general, Jobs with Justice was contracted by San Francisco LAFCo to assist in 
various aspects of its Gig Economy study, namely driver and community outreach and survey 
administration. The more technical aspects of the survey design and quantitative data analysis 
were performed by UC Santa Cruz professor and labor researcher Chris Benner. This 
collaborative effort between San Francisco LAFCo, Jobs with Justice and Professor Benner 
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resulted in a widely inclusive study designed to gauge how gig workers are faring in the current 
(pre-AB5) system financially, physically, psychologically, and logistically. 
My personal involvement with this study primarily included conducting outreach to Bay 
Area-based gig workers, namely Uber and Lyft drivers. The goal of this outreach was to 
encourage these workers to attend focus groups that the research team had planned as the final 
step in the pre-research process which would inform the contents of the final gig worker survey. 
Due to the lack of central physical locations for drivers to congregate throughout their work 
days, I conducted this outreach both on and offline. The online outreach was conducted through 
driver forums and social media pages, a tactic that I utilized again during research for this 
capstone project. Once I was permitted entry into these online spaces - which usually entailed 
explaining my intentions and affiliations with group administrators - I began sending out a 
carefully crafted message describing the research study as a whole and its underlying goals while 
extending the offer for those interested to attend the upcoming focus groups. In this message, I 
was sure to emphasize that the research group was in no way affiliated with any TNCs, was 
approaching the research with minimal bias, and would treat the maintenance of respondent 
anonymity with the utmost care. In addition to this outreach, I was tasked with monitoring the 
activity of these groups in order to ascertain the aspects of gig work that drivers most commonly 
discussed and thus were most salient to our survey. The posts on such forums and social media 
pages run the gamut from complaints about ill-behaved passengers to questions regarding 
income tax filing protocol, providing a surprisingly comprehensive look into the complexities 
and eccentricities of working in the Gig Economy.  
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Conducting offline outreach proved markedly more difficult but ultimately yielded 
pleasing results. Due to the aforementioned decentralized nature of gig work and the lack of 
officially-recognized or widely known places for drivers to congregate during their workday, 
finding the proper areas to conduct offline outreach was perhaps the most difficult aspect of this 
process. My fellow researchers and I first attempted to approach drivers at highly-trafficked gas 
stations throughout San Francisco, but the infrequency with which drivers visited such stations 
combined with the relatively short amount of time they typically spend at stations rendered this 
approach largely ineffective. We then focused our outreach on large parking lots in the 
immediate vicinity of the San Francisco and Oakland airports, which we had heard large groups 
of Uber and Lyft drivers populate while waiting to be assigned rides to pick people up from these 
airports. The nature of drivers’ presence at these makeshift staging lots eliminated many of the 
problematic aspects of approaching drivers at gas stations, namely the time constraints associated 
with gas station visits. This approach proved to be rather successful, as just under half of the 
drivers that ultimately attended the focus groups were initially contacted at these locations. 
While these attempts at in-person gig worker outreach were productive in terms of 
boosting focus group attendance, they figured just as prominently in the development of my 
political communication skills as well as my knowledge of the Gig Economy as a whole. Though 
my colleagues and I wrote and practiced a “rap,” or outreach script before contacting drivers 
directly, the one-off nature of such conversations forced me to think critically and alter my 
inquiries and appeals in real-time. While conversing with drivers did require a considerable 
amount of background knowledge on the Gig Economy, approaching these conversations - 
which cover personal and politicized subjects - with adequate respect and compassion for the 
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perspectives shared by drivers proved to be the key to successful outreach. Exposure to drivers’ 
actual thoughts, uncertainties and concerns regarding their work forced me to consider the Gig 
Economy in a more nuanced manner, as the wide range of experiences and perspectives I 
encountered challenged my initial notion that all drivers experience and relate to the system they 
work within in a similar way. Ultimately, this experience compounded my understanding of 
many aspects of the Gig Economy - the immense power and informational imbalances that exist 
between TNCs and  their workers, the issues and complexities that regulating such an industry 
entails, the contentious nature of the driver classification issue - in a way that sparked my interest 
and led to me centering my capstone on Uber, the Gig Economy’s most prominent and powerful 
corporation. 
Upon the completion of my internship at Jobs with Justice, I received a gift from the 
organization’s executive director. The gift was a book -  Alex Rosenblat’s ​Uberland: How 
Algorithms are Rewriting the Rules of Work ​- and its contents would propel my understanding of 
the Gig Economy toward the formulation of my research question. I left this internship with a 
lingering confusion regarding how companies like Uber were able to get away with 
misclassifying their workers and disobeying livery laws for years on end. During this internship 
I’d noticed a cavernous divergence between the public perception and actual practices of 
companies like Uber, and wanted to investigate how the company presents its labor systems to 
the public, to drivers and to regulators - what narratives they try to push, what they say drivers 
want - in comparison to the actual facts about their systems of labor as told to me by drivers. 
Rosenblat’s discussion of Uber’s use of algorithmic management to obscure the levers of control 
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it enjoys over its drivers’ actions in ​Uberland​ began to explain this phenomenon from a 
technological perspective.  
While this explanation partially satiated my interest and underlying confusion, as it 
discussed the underpinning technology that makes this system palatable for drivers, it did not 
completely engage with how this system is sold to customers, regulators and the public at large. 
This lingering interest drew me to the concept of corporate identity, which entails many aspects 
of a company’s public-facing efforts including advertising, formal communications and 
organizational behavioral patterns, as a vehicle through which to further analyze Uber’s 
avoidance of labor regulation on my own accord. It was during this time that I began to notice 
different threads of research being produced that were related to the topic of my interest, 
including the LAFCo study concerning drivers’ well-being and Rosenblat’s research on 
algorithmic management in particular. These threads, as well as a number of older sources that 
underpin and inform contemporary inquiries into the Gig Economy, are explored in detail in the 
following literature review. 
 
3. ​Literature Review 
This literature review addresses four distinct but interrelated bodies of literature: works 
on the role of technology in society, on corporate identity, on Uber’s corporate leadership, and 
on precarious work in the United States. In order to gain sufficient context regarding the ideals 
and assumptions that underpin Uber’s corporate identity, it is important to track both the 
economic implications of internet-based technology and how popular conceptions of the 
appropriate role of technology in society have evolved over time. As technologies developed 
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during the immediate postwar era and into the 1970’s have become ubiquitous, some scholars 
argue that the ideologies and worldviews held by those who created such technologies have, both 
implicitly and explicitly, become increasingly prominent as well. Entrepreneurial and 
institutional actors alike have co-opted these technologies for myriad applications as they have 
become increasingly sophisticated and their societal presence normalized. One such co-optation 
that is particularly relevant to this research is that of systems of labor administration. While one 
cohort of scholars has lauded this infusion of technology into the workplace for its theoretical 
potential to democratize and decentralize what they feel has become detrimentally retrograde and 
hierarchical system of labor relations, others have adopted a more skeptical point of view, noting 
that technological progress does not necessarily address structural imbalances of power. In order 
to fully understand the contentions surrounding the technologization of systems of labor 
administration, however, one must first examine the technology industry’s ideological 
underpinnings.  
 
a. Technology’s Role in Society 
When researching an industry that is as defined by its idiosyncrasies and willingness to 
break with tradition as the tech industry, one may not expect to find a wider ethos that unites its 
representative companies’ goals, ideals and visions of progress. However, there is wide 
agreement among scholars and experts that Silicon Valley’s most influential actors share such a 
view - that an unwavering faith in the power of innovation and an unrelenting pursuit of 
efficiency will lead to increasingly positive economic, ecological and social outcomes (Hasinoff, 
Turner, Hill, Morozov). In his foundational work ​From Counterculture to Cyberculture, ​Fred 
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Turner traces the development of this ethos from its roots in the countercultural 1960’s “Whole 
Earth Network” movement to its current place within the c-suites of ​Fortune ​500 corporations, 
centering his inquiry on the “Whole Earth Network’s” creator, Stewart Brand.  
According to Turner, “Between the 1960’s and 1990’s, Brand assembled a network of 
people and publications that together brokered a series of encounters between bohemian San 
Francisco and the emerging technology hub of Silicon Valley to its south,” which ultimately led 
to the “complex intertwining of two cultural forces: the military-industrial research culture which 
thrived in the Cold War, and the American counterculture” (Turner 2006, 3). Turner calls what 
resulted from Brand’s grand experiment “techno-utopianism,” or a blend of the “free-wheeling, 
interdisciplinary and highly entrepreneurial style of work” being fostered in the US 
military-industrial sector and the countercultural belief that “traditional political mechanisms for 
creating social change had become bankrupt” (Turner 2006, 4). Thus, Turner claims, a new 
“cybernetic” view of the world, one in which “material reality could be reimagined as an 
information system,” was popularized amongst “a generation that had grown up in a world beset 
by massive armies and the threat of nuclear holocaust” (Turner 2006, 5).  
This generation, which found comfort and even the possibility of global harmony in “the 
cybernetic vision of the globe as a single, interlinked pattern of information,” would eventually 
become Silicon Valley’s most influential spiritual and corporate leaders (Turner 2006, 5). This 
future, however, seemed far from Brand and his collaborators’ minds when they created the 
“Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link” (WELL), which is one of the earliest examples of a public-facing 
internet. Essentially an online community bulletin board system to facilitate communication 
between “Whole Earth Network” members, WELL’s animating purpose was community service 
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rather than any potential corporate applications. It was only as these technologies developed to 
the point where their applicability to corporate endeavors became readily apparent that we began 
to see such technologies drive massive wealth creation and, eventually, inequality. 
 While Turner’s work focuses on the process by which “techno-utopian” ideology spread 
within and was shaped by the groups that would eventually foster Silicon Valley’s elite, Manuel 
Castells’ ​Rise of the Network Society ​analyzes this phenomenon on a societal level. According to 
Castells, despite the apolitical and individualistic nature of ideological movements like the 
“Whole Earth Network,” the technologies that emerged from such movements must be 
considered within the context of their relationships with society at large. This is partially due to 
the “​decisive role of military funding and markets in fostering early stages of the electronics 
industry during the 1940-60s,” but, more fundamentally, the role that technological innovation 
has played in different societies’ developmental trajectories throughout history (Castells 2000, 
5). Without going so far as claiming that technological innovation alone drives societal 
progression, Castells posits that it “embodies the capacity of societies to transform themselves, 
as well as the uses to which societies, always in a conflictive process, decide to put their 
technological potential” (Castells 2000, 7). The primary example that Castells uses to illustrate 
this point is the “Information Technology Revolution” that occurred during the 1970’s as a result 
of the Keynesian postwar industrial economy’s failure to continue to produce growth, which, in 
addition to shifting away from industrial production and toward a service and information-based 
economy, “​prompted a wholesale reorganization which included: deregulation, privatization, and 
the dismantling of the social contract between capital and labor” (Castells 2000, 13). This theory 
places Brand’s “cybernetic vision of the world,” despite its chief proponents’ disinterest and 
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disregard for traditional structures of power, as the very ideology that allowed this world-altering 
economic shift to take place, ironically making Brand and a number of his colleagues rather 
wealthy and powerful as a result.  
Such unwavering belief in the inherent beneficence of technological progress, aside from 
precipitating the sort of macro-level economic and social changes outlined in Castells’ work, 
may lead to overly deterministic and binary conceptions of technology’s role in society as well. 
This view is exemplified in Evgeny Morozov’s ​To Save Everything, Click Here, ​which centers 
its analysis on the concept of “technological solutionism.” Operating as a dangerous but not 
unnatural conclusion drawn from the narratives popularized by the “Whole Earth Network” and 
contemporary tech evangelists, “technological solutionism” is defined by Morozov as “recasting 
all complex social situations either as neatly defined problems with definite, computable 
solutions or as transparent and self evident processes that can be easily optimized - if only the 
right algorithms are in place - this quest is likely to have unexpected consequences that could 
eventually cause more damage than the problems they seek to address” (Morozov 2013, 5). Chief 
among the pitfalls of treating all societal issues as distinct problems with singular technological 
solutions is the incongruity that Morozov claims exists between the end goals that technological 
advancements are designed to pursue - namely efficiency and speed - with the intended outcomes 
of various pre-existing societal structures. To this end, Morozov states that “a deeper 
investigation into the very nature of these problems would reveal that the inefficiency, 
ambiguity, opacity - whether in politics or everyday life - that the newly empowered geeks and 
solutionists are rallying against are not in any sense problematic. Quite the opposite: these vices 
are often virtues in disguise” (Morozov 2013, 6). In other words, Morozov argues that proposed 
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technological solutions to societal issues are able to pursue improvement only through gains in 
efficiency and, in turn, are unable to account for any unrelated benefits that an inefficient, 
opaque, or ambiguous system may include. This application of Capitalist, efficiency-seeking 
value structures to systems traditionally incentivized and informed by ideals like stability, equity 
or tradition, Morozov argues, has produced far less favorable societal outcomes than the 
“techno-utopian” ethos would lead us to believe.  
While Morozov’s thesis addresses the application of “technological solutionism” to many 
aspects of society, Ted Striphas’ ​Algorithmic Culture​ compliments Morozov’s thesis through its 
focus on the dangers of applying such logic to processes of cultural production. What makes 
Striphas’ analysis truly important to this conversation is his poignant description of “the work of 
culture” as “t​he sorting, classifying and hierarchizing of people, places, objects and ideas” 
(Striphas 2015, 406). Striphas notes that the delegation of this work to algorithms and 
mathematical models shifts the way that culture has traditionally been produced in a way that is 
dehumanized and decontextualized, which he ultimately posits will “privatize the process” 
(Striphas 2015, 406). To Striphas, culture and its production are inherently social processes 
created by “ongoing struggle to determine the values, practices and artifacts—the culture, as it 
were—of specific social groups” (Striphas 2015, 406). Despite Morozov and Striphas’ ​warnings 
about the dangerous outcomes a systematically optimized culture might produce, there have been 
many who champion the role it can play in democratizing and decentralizing the Economy.  
This school of thought is based on Coasian Firm Theory, which posits that economic 
actors will choose to align themselves in ways that minimize the transaction costs associated 
with their enterprise. Traditionally, this theory has been used as justification for the existence of 
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firms, as they are seen as more efficient facilitators of commerce than individuals operating 
within a marketplace (Coase 1937, 389). As algorithmic technology has become increasingly 
sophisticated, scholars have begun to consider its application to economic relationships in 
similarly Coasian terms, positing that algorithmically-administered commerce further reduces 
transaction costs. This is the precise position Yochai Benkler takes in his 2002 piece “Coase’s 
Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm,” which outlines the virtues of such a shift toward 
decentralized, socially reciprocal and algorithmically-administered commerce far before the 
dawn of the gig economy as we know it today. Specifically, Benkler notes that this system is 
preferable because it is better at “identifying and assigning human capital to information and 
cultural production processes” and thus decreases inefficiencies inherent to the traditional firm 
and market-based Capitalist structure (Benkler 2002, 399). In the roughly two decades since 
Benkler’s piece was published, his thesis has been reiterated and expanded upon as algorithmic 
technology has become more widely adopted throughout different sectors of the economy, 
arguably reaching a fever pitch during the advent of the Gig Economy. 
One such piece that exists in Benkler’s shadow is Juliet Schor and Connor Fitzmaurice’s 
Collaborating and Collecting​. Situating their analysis within the context of the Great Recession, 
a period of transformational economic uncertainty and job precarity, Schor and Fitzmaurice note 
that many young people have responded to these economic conditions by seeking to secure 
themselves through what they call “connected consumption,” or relying on electronically 
mediated peer-to-peer transactions rather than traditional market actors to mediate exchanges 
(Fitzmaurice and Schor 2015, 3). This shift away from reliance upon traditional market actors is 
understandable in the aftermath of a financial crisis that saw some of the world’s most 
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entrenched and valuable corporations and institutions crumble. However, Schor and Fitzmaurice 
make sure to temper expectations of this system’s ability to foster economic justice by 
suggesting that “the market orientation and organization of sharing economy platforms—as well 
as whether exchanges are monetized or non monetized—are critical characteristics shaping these 
platforms and their potential to provide truly alternative economic arrangements” (Fitzmaurice 
and Schor 2015, 3). Essentially, Schor and Fitzmaurice argue that this system’s transformative 
potential rests in its application as a technologically-aided barter system amongst actors of 
relatively equal power, thus also serving as a warning against its co-optation by profit driven 
actors - be they entrepreneurial or institutional. Though well-intentioned, such a warning rings 
somewhat hollow when made within the contemporary market capitalist context, wherein the 
kinds of equal power dynamics championed by Schor and Fitzmaurice rarely, if ever, exist for 
long. 
The very sort of co-optation and corporatization that Schor and Fitzmaurice warn against 
is the primary theme of Alex Rosenblat and Ryan Calo’s ​The Taking Economy, ​which uses Uber 
as an avatar of the tech industry’s repurposing of such decentralized, reciprocal systems of 
exchange. This piece focuses on Uber’s utilization of the term “The Sharing Economy” to 
describe and frame its then-novel peer-to-peer, app based mobility services. Rosenblat and Calo 
argue that this frame, although openly accepted by mainstream media and governmental actors 
for some time, was deliberately co-opted and utilized by Uber’s executives in efforts to paint 
their austere and exploitative practices as being based in social reciprocity and trust facilitated 
via an app (Calo and Rosenblat 2017, 1637). Although it was immediately clear to anyone 
remotely familiar with Uber’s business model that nothing was being “shared” in these 
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transactions, Uber was able to champion this terminology and its underlying assumptions for an 
ultimately short but nonetheless crucial period of time in which its financial might and cultural 
cache grew formidably.  
“The Taking Economy” is representative of a wider shift in thought that occurred over 
the latter half of the 2010’s in which scholarly interest in the Gig Economy’s rhetorical and 
theoretical roots was supplanted by analyses of how this rhetoric was being applied in practice 
and how these applications affected gig workers. While Calo and Rosenblat primarily focus their 
piece on gig economy rhetoric, they also point to the ways in which the decentralized systems of 
worker administration informed by this rhetoric impact gig workers both positively and 
negatively (Calo and Rosenblat 2017, 1641-1647). Many of these impacts have to do with the 
perceived agency that gig workers enjoy while on the job and the role that algorithmic 
management systems play in the maintenance of this agency or the perpetuation of illusory 
agency. Cathy O’Neil’s ​Weapons of Math Destruction ​further calls this traditionally-accepted 
notion of algorithmic neutrality into question through a mixture of case studies, theoretical 
analysis and O’Neil’s own experiences as a mathematician and data scientist. Drawing on her 
own professional experience designing and analyzing mathematical models, one type of which 
are algorithms, O’Neil warns that such models “reflect goals and ideology” of those who create 
them, equating them to “opinions embedded in mathematics” (O’Neil 2016, 21). This framing is 
important as it resituates responsibility for these models’ output, both positive and negative, onto 
their designers and the entities that hire and direct them. Algorithms that govern labor systems, 
O’Neil posits, are “optimized for efficiency and profitability, not for justice or the good of the 
team,” making their objectives no more altruistic than profit seeking enterprises run directly by 
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human executives (O’Neil 2016, 129-130). While the algorithms that dictate work in the Gig 
Economy may be driven by familiarly self-serving objectives and motives, the 
worker-corporation relationship that they’ve created is novel and only partially understood. 
One such inquiry into gig workers’ reactions to and considerations of their work being 
administered by an algorithm is “​Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and 
Data-Driven Management on Human Workers,” a study of Uber drivers conducted in 2015. This 
study, conducted by a team of researchers led by Min Kyung Lee, aimed to shed light on 
foundational questions regarding the nature of algorithmically administered work, namely how 
workers cooperate with algorithmically-assigned work, how algorithmic optimization motivates 
workers (if at all), and how data-driven worker evaluation systems are perceived (Lee 2015, 1). 
While this study’s findings on driver opinions were less than conclusive - surveyed drivers held 
moderately positive opinions on dispatch algorithms, were largely indifferent to surge pricing 
and held moderately negative opinions on driver rating systems - the researchers’ justifications 
for these findings illuminate the psychological impact of gig work on a much wider scale. Based 
upon their findings, Lee et al.​  “believe the organizational context of being independent 
contractors played an important role: the flexibility and choices that the ridesharing drivers have 
in work compensate for the lack of control in assignment algorithms” (Lee 2015, 8). This belief 
points to the potential of a self-perpetuating reality of gig work in which drivers’ expectations of 
workplace autonomy are tempered by their independent contractor status, which in turn makes 
their independent contractor status more palatable and seem more logical. Though this is 
important research done on what at that time had been an under-studied and notoriously difficult 
to survey group of workers, many of its findings are either marginally relevant or wholly 
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obsolete in 2020, as many of the work structures it inquires about are either markedly different or 
have been completely replaced. Gig economy companies are known to alter their business 
practices and policies very frequently and often with little warning, making studying or 
regulating these practices in the long term uncommonly difficult.  
Naturally, as Uber and the rest of the Gig Economy became increasingly prominent, the 
body of qualitative research conducted on its participants grew accordingly. No example of this 
research is as expansive or pointed in its criticism of these structures as Alex Rosenblat’s 
Uberland, ​which combines ethnographic research with critical analysis in a manner that exposes 
the Gig Economy’s massive potential for worker exploitation and manipulation. Rosenblat’s 
analysis is based upon a similar premise to Lee et al. 's - the impact of algorithmic administration 
on workers - but her research points to a considerably more sinister and exploitative reality than 
many earlier analyses. Rosenblat points to algorithmic management as the primary means by 
which Uber is able to create and maintain an information discrepancy between its corporate 
entity and its drivers large enough to enjoy significant control over its drivers’ workflow without 
the levers of such control becoming obvious or obtrusive (Rosenblat 2018, 92). While she notes 
that these levers of control - no matter how opaque they may be - are of varying importance to 
drivers who rely on income from driving to different degrees, she maintains that such systems 
can easily become unsustainable and exploitative if left unchecked and unregulated (Rosenblat 
2018, 50). It is this system of algorithmic management that, Rosenblat posits, allows Uber to 
continue to market itself as an entrepreneurial opportunity for its drivers, a position that has 




b. Corporate Identity 
The sort of identity creation and storytelling that Rosenblat points to - Uber’s positioning 
of itself as an engine of economic opportunity through entrepreneurialism - is a prime example 
of a concept known as corporate identity. As corporations have become increasingly politically 
empowered, advertising and marketing technologies have become incredibly sophisticated, and 
the general public has become increasingly conscious of its consumption habits, corporations 
have become increasingly inclined to project favorable images of their practices, their leaders, 
and their impact on society at large. This newfound autonomy in terms of narrative setting has 
become a major source of corporate power in recent decades, but there remains considerable 
disagreement on the ultimate beneficence of this trend. In analyzing the net societal impact of 
corporate identity, it is important to first explore the contours of corporate identity as it is defined 
by thought leaders within the world of business marketing. In doing so, one stands to gain insight 
into the characteristics that are believed to constitute an effective corporate identity,  the 
perceived functions that corporate identity serves, and the institutional values it is supposed to 
represent or uphold.  
The concept of corporate identity is loosely defined by Cees B.M van Reil and John M.T. 
Balmer in their piece titled “Corporate Identity: the Concept, Its Measurement and Management” 
as corporations’ attempts at fostering favorable public opinions of themselves through symbolic 
and visual cues, formal corporate communication (both internal and external), and overall 
organizational behavior patterns (Balmer and van Riel 1997, 341). Symbolic and visual cues 
refer to the color schemes, logos, typefaces and other design elements that corporations include 
in their advertising and other public-facing endeavors. Similarly, formal corporate 
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communication entails the actual written content of corporations’ advertising and other 
public-facing endeavors as well as statements made by executives or legal counsel on behalf of a 
corporation. Behavioral patterns delve somewhat beyond the surface and entail a corporation’s 
partnerships, business and labor practices, organizational structure and relationship with 
governing or regulatory bodies.  
Despite the widely inclusive nature of their definition, however, van Riel and Balmer 
note that many scholars believe that corporate identity is a concept that is too dynamic and 
multidisciplinary to be formally defined (International Corporate Identity Group 2019). This 
belief is outlined in the “Strathclyde Statement”, an official position taken by the International 
Corporate Identity Group (ICIG) in which corporate identity’s various aspects are explained but 
the term as a whole is not formally defined (International Corporate Identity Group 2019). This 
statement’s primary function is to differentiate corporate identity from what the ICIG calls 
traditional “brand marketing,” which is only concerned with engaging consumers while 
corporate identity aims to engage a wide variety of actors including potential investors, 
regulators and the corporation’s own employees. The multifaceted nature of Balmer and van 
Riel’s definition as well as the Strathclyde Statement’s aforementioned implications point to the 
variety of audiences and stakeholders that corporations’ self-crafted identities are intended to 
persuade. 
Though these pieces do well to provide insight into the values and goals that drive 
business leaders’ attempts at fostering favorable corporate identities, they do not address the 
underlying phenomena of human actors ascribing human characteristics to the inherently 
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inhuman, socially-constructed entity that is the corporation itself. Expanding on this viewpoint is 
Richard Hardack’s “New and Improved: The Zero-Sum Game of Corporate Personhood,” which 
ultimately makes the argument that corporations take on the characteristics of the individuals 
who establish them through the managerial and advertising decisions those individuals make, 
which are based upon the economic, cultural and social circumstances of the time (Hardack 
2014, 36). Ascribing human features onto an inorganic entity like a corporation is, according to 
Hardack, only possible due to corporations’ legal status and the rights that this status explicitly 
affords their proprietors (Hardack 2014, 37). Hardack extrapolates his argument that since 
corporations are inorganic entities, their corporate speech should be legally regarded as 
commercial speech and by definition cannot be considered political speech, thus making it 
subject to regulation under the commerce clause of the constitution (Hardack 2014, 38-39). 
Hardack’s argument seems to center executive level decision-making as the factor most 
intrinsically linked to the features of a corporation’s identity. Though their thinking will almost 
always be dictated by market trends, technological innovation and consumer preference to at 
least some degree, these factors are similarly subject to the interpretation of individuals replete 
with their own biases, beliefs and egos. In the case of Uber and its ascendant path, the biases, 
beliefs and egos that mattered most were those of its two co-founders Travis Kalanick and 
Garrett Camp. Though complimentary in their respective areas of expertise, with Camp as the 
technical expert and Kalanick the corporate strategist, their respective visions for their 
company’s future were often times at odds, with Camp envisioning Uber remaining an exclusive 
black car service and Kalanick (along with some of the company’s earliest and most influential 
investors) preferring a peer-to-peer model avoiding the numerous regulations inherent in 
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traditional livery transportation (Isaac 2019, 49-50; Stone 2017, 120-121). These two visions are 
laid out in two recent books - Brad Stone’s ​The Upstarts​ and Mike Isaac’s ​Super Pumped - ​ that 
recount the company’s inception and the shared set of beliefs that inspired it (Isaac 2019, 49-50; 
Stone 2017, 44-45). 
 
c. Uber’s Corporate Leadership 
Super Pumped ​(2019) primarily focuses on how Kalanick fashioned Uber in his own 
image and according to his own personally held-ideals during his tenure as the company’s CEO. 
The book’s prologue provides a detailed account of the manner in which he preferred to launch 
Uber’s services in a new city: without the consent and often against the wishes of local 
lawmakers or interest groups (Isaac 2019, xiii-xiv). This preference stemmed from Kalanick’s 
“belief that politicians, when it came down to it, would always act the same way: they would 
protect the established order” (Isaac 2019, xv). This belief, coupled with his deeply held notion 
that Uber was “transformational” and would produce positive societal outcomes if allowed to 
operate as originally intended, prompted Kalanick’s decision to operate his company outside the 
confines of legality.  
The long-term impacts of this hyper-aggressive and law-flouting environment established 
and incentivized by Uber’s top executives is chronicled in Benjamin Edelman’s piece in the 
Harvard Business Review ​titled “Uber Can’t be Fixed...It’s Time for Regulators to Shut it 
Down” (Edelman 2017). In this piece, Edelman attributes this growth-inducing but unsustainable 
internal identity to Kalanick’s leadership style. In making the initial decision to operate outside 
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the confines of local transportation laws in the interest of maximizing growth, Kalanick instilled 
in his employees the incentive to follow his example to the extent that this became a core aspect 
of the company’s internal identity and source of pride amongst employees. Uber employees’ 
eagerness to follow Kalanick’s reckless example is explained in ​Super Pumped ​as having two 
primary sources: Kalanick’s own seemingly boundless energy and passion for the company’s 
product and Silicon Valley’s culture of “founder worship,” which venerated successful 
entrepreneurship as the pinnacle of human accomplishment and virtue (Isaac 2019, 74-75, 84). 
By the time Kalanick was forced to exit the company amidst myriad instances of personal and 
professional misconduct, this ethos had become so thoroughly baked into Uber’s business model 
that Edelman felt inclined to openly call for cities whose laws Uber has violated to essentially 
fine the company into bankruptcy (Edelman 2017).  
Despite the clear transgressions that Edelman’s article lays out, Uber remains a hugely 
influential archetype within the startup milieu, as it is inspiring new waves of technology-based 
businesses to tread similarly dicey paths. The spread of this reckless, all-or-nothing approach to 
revenue growth is chronicled in Jordan M. Berry and Elizabeth Pollman’s article “Regulatory 
Entrepreneurship.” In this piece, Pollman and Berry position Uber and Lyfts’ approach to 
dealing with regulation within a wider category of corporate behavior that they call “regulatory 
entrepreneurship,” which they define as “pursuing a line of business in which changing the law is 
a significant part of the business plan” (Berry and Pollman 2017, 383). In their diagnosis of how 
companies that operate in such murky legal waters - the likes of AirBNB, DraftKings, and Tesla 
in addition to TNCs - have been able to not only maintain operations but thrive, Pollman and 
Berry point to a handful of common characteristics, namely that they are “well-funded, scalable, 
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and highly connected startup businesses with mass appeal” (Berry and Pollman 2017, 383). 
These characteristics point to the central importance of fostering positive corporate identities 
with a wide range of societal stakeholders in companies’ ability to maintain such business 
models and fight off regulation. The descriptors “well-funded, scalable, highly connected...with 
mass appeal” allude to the roles that the various audiences that will be included in the theoretical 
analysis portion of this research - customers, regulators, and workers - play in the creation and 
preservation of Uber’s corporate identity and thus its ability to avoid regulation of its labor 
practices.  
Of all the aforementioned stakeholders and the various important roles that their 
complicity plays in the preservation of Uber’s corporate identity, investors seem to be among the 
most overlooked. Though their overall economic and cultural relevance is readily apparent, 
venture capitalists’ influence over the risky and at times illegal behavior of the companies they 
fund is often left under-examined. The unequal stakes that characterize the investor-corporation 
relationship are clearly identified and explained in Douglas Rushkoff’s ​Throwing Rocks at the 
Google Bus, ​in which the author explains that while venture capital firms fund dozens if not 
hundreds of companies at a time, they expect the vast majority of these companies to fail and 
thus impose extremely high growth requirements on their investees to ensure that the few that ​do 
succeed will supply them with an exponential return on their investment (Rushkoff 2016, 189). 
Isaac similarly explains this mode of operation in ​Super Pumped​ when he notes that “for venture 
capitalists and founders alike, the goal is to guide the company to either B or C rounds [of 
funding] or ‘liquidity events.’ Those are when a VC can finally convert shares in a company into 
cash” (Isaac 2019, 73). While this may be a financially prudent investing strategy on the venture 
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capitalist’s part, it is these very unnaturally high growth requirements that incentivize and, in 
many cases, necessitate the implementation of potentially nefarious and illegal practices by the 
companies these firms are investing in.  
Venture Capital firms may control the purse strings, but the power relationships that exist 
between them and tech company founders are considerably more complex than this fact alone 
might allude to. As Isaac notes in ​Super Pumped, ​the tech industry’s maturation into a major 
global economic force endowed successful​ ​tech entrepreneurs with not only visionary, almost 
mythical status, but an increasing ability to maintain operational and strategic control over their 
companies throughout the process of receiving funding as well (Isaac 2019, 75-76). Inspired by 
Google co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Kalanick sought to maintain as much 
operational and strategic control over his company as possible. According to Isaac, this meant 
securing investment while ceding as few ownership shares, board seats, and as little voting 
power as possible, even going as far as adopting a two-tiered system of ownership share 
allocation called a “dual class stock structure” which affords additional voting power to shares 
held by Kalanick as opposed to those held by investors (Isaac 2019, 76, 97). Though Kalanick 
was successful in his bid to retain as much decision-making power for himself as possible 
throughout the fundraising process, he guided the company in a way that largely adhered to the 
same ideals and goal structure held by most venture capitalists - the pursuit of maximum revenue 
growth and market share attainment. It is difficult to tell what exactly Kalanick’s reasoning for 
this pursuit was. Though the grandiosity with which he was inclined to speak about Uber’s 
ultimate potential would point to a deep-seated belief in the transformational power of his 
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company’s product, this unrelenting pursuit of growth was likely also intended to ensure the 
company’s continued access to venture capital funding. 
Regardless of the source of the growth-driven ethos Kalanick adopted, its dictation of 
Uber’s labor practices and by extension the working conditions of drivers is abundantly clear. In 
documents filed with regulatory bodies, Uber’s management has explicitly stated that in order to 
accomplish their aforementioned goals, maintaining drivers’ status as independent contractors 
and thus minimizing labor costs is of primary importance (S-1 2019, 28). However, what Uber’s 
executives have traditionally been opaque about, and what researchers have taken a keen interest 
in, are the wider implications that this work configuration may have for workers themselves and 
on society as a whole. Within this body of research, two main themes of inquiry have emerged: 
the impact of flexible and precarious work arrangements on workers’ economic outcomes and 
personal well-being and the difficulties of effectively regulating these sorts of arrangements. 
 
d. Precarious Work in the United States 
One study that undertakes an exhaustive, long-term historical analysis of labor precarity 
in the United States is Arne Kalleberg’s “Precarious Work, Insecure Workers,” which was 
published at the height of the Great Recession in 2009. Kalleberg’s research covers three primary 
topics: evidence of precarious work’s rise since the 1970’s, the consequences of this rise on a 
societal level, and a plea for his fellow sociologists to turn their attention to labor precarity in 
hopes of compounding on society’s understanding of its social, rather than simply its economic, 
impacts (Kalleberg 2009, 2-11). While Kalleberg’s discussion of topics like the gradual shifting 
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of risk from employer to employee and the growth of perceived job insecurity among workers 
provides necessary context through which one can analyze Uber’s role in this phenomenon, as 
are his musings on precarity’s role in exacerbating wealth inequality, perhaps the most lasting 
contribution of this work is its clear enunciation of labor precarity’s public policy implications 
(Kalleberg 2009, 7-8).  
Fully recognizing the hegemony of contemporary free market globalization, Kalleberg 
points to the need for public policy solutions that “seek to help people deal with the uncertainty 
and unpredictability of their work— and their resulting confusion and increasingly chaotic and 
insecure lives—while still preserving some of the flexibility that employers need to compete in a 
global marketplace” (Kalleberg 2009, 16). Ultimately, Kalleberg points to revitalized social 
protections “to alleviate the disruptions caused by the operation of unfettered markets” and 
policies to create non-precarious jobs as the two primary strategies for combating precarity 
(Kalleberg 2009, 16). Kalleberg’s diagnosis of the problem and policy proposals, broad as they 
may be, provide important context that situates the Gig Economy’s rise within a larger social 
phenomenon and, using insights from this decades long shift toward precarity, clearly lays out 
the stakes involved in this shift. 
Subsequent efforts to analyze this vexing phenomenon have adopted a more granular 
approach, at times even proposing alternative ways of measuring precarity. Wayne Lewchuk 
attempts just this in his 2017 piece “Precarious Jobs: where are they, and how do they affect 
well-being?” Lewchuk begins his inquiry by citing the inadequacies of traditional labor market 
data, namely their inability to track rises in temporary and casual employment. This argument 
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dovetails with Kalleberg’s piece nicely, as it justifies Kalleberg’s reliance on tangentially related 
phenomenon like rises in perceived job insecurity and decrease in average tenure length in his 
analysis of precarity (Lewchuk 2017, 402; Kalleberg 2009, 6-7). In an attempt to compensate for 
these inadequacies, which he believes chronically under-represent employment precarity, 
Lewchuk proposes a new measurement that he calls the Economic Precarity Index, or EPI, which 
he describes as being​ designed “to explore the security characteristics of different forms of the 
employment relationship...offering a tool to measure employment security… and assess how 
insecure employment associated with a ‘gig’ economy might affect well-being and social 
relations, including health outcomes, household well-being and community involvement” 
(Lewchuk 2017, 403). To accomplish this, Lewchuk breaks down precarity into ten indicative 
components which can be used to survey workers, including schedule consistency, week-to-week 
income variance, employer-provided benefits and prevalence of cash-based income, among 
others (Lewchuk 2017, 410). Despite this and other commendable efforts to break down this 
multifaceted and nuanced phenomenon into easily digestible figures, precarity remains a concept 
rife with inherent subjectivity, making its precise quantification very unlikely.  
Unsurprisingly, precarity’s unwieldy nature as a topic of study has significantly 
complicated efforts to combat it through legislative means. These difficulties have prompted 
scholars to seek alternative lenses through which to view and characterize precarity, at times in 
hopes of convincing employers themselves to more actively address the precarity of their own 
workforces, and critiquing customary regulatory frameworks at others. A prime example of a 
piece that attempts the former is “Uber Drivers and Employment Status in the Gig Economy,” 
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which aims to convince Uber and other Gig Economy companies to alter their employment 
tactics by appealing to a concept called “corporate social responsibility” (Malos et al. 2018, 239).  
According to the study’s authors, “corporate social responsibility” is a tactic used by 
corporations to address the social implications of their business, namely the economic, physical 
and mental well-being of their employees, through actions beyond regulatory compliance” 
(Malos et al. 2018, 239).  By definition, since it goes beyond mandated worker benefits and 
protections, corporate social responsibility “maintains that companies should perform in a 
manner consistent with expectations of societal mores, recognize evolving ethical/moral norms 
adopted by society, prevent those norms from being compromised in order to achieve business 
goals, and recognize that ethical behavior goes beyond mere compliance with laws and 
regulations” (Malos et al. 2018, 247). Under this definition and its implications, the authors 
argue that Uber and other Gig Economy companies “have a responsibility to their workers to 
help them maintain a living wage and decent levels of social welfare” which, in their estimate, 
includes reclassifying drivers as employees (Malos et al. 2018, 247). Clearly, this argument 
hinges on grand assumptions made regarding the existence of uniform social mores across 
society, the nature of corporate behavior as something separate from that of corporate executives 
and the congruence between business goals and positive social outcomes, all of which seem to 
oversimplify labor precarity in its contemporary manifestation.  
Such assumptions become increasingly dubious when one considers the unique nature of 
gig economy companies in relation to traditional corporations and firms, a topic that Julia 
Tomassetti dedicates considerable attention to in “Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The 
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Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced Information Technology.” Essentially, Tomassetti 
alleges that difficulties faced in attempts to regulate the Gig Economy stem from social 
scientists' and regulators’ antiquated conception of what principles contemporary corporations 
operate under. She posits that, rather than the “industrial model” favored by regulators and social 
scientists, companies in the gig economy should be considered “post-industrial corporations,” 
which she defines as a corporation that “​still seeks to maximize profits, but not necessarily 
through productive enterprise. It may pursue shareholder value through asset manipulation, 
speculative activity, and regulatory arbitrage and evasion” (Tomassetti 2016, 5). Tomassetti’s 
primary argument, however, addresses Uber’s claim that it’s business transcends all conceptions 
of the firm and acts as a digital market intermediary between independent transportation 
businesses and consumers. Drawing from Coasian Firm Theory, Tomassetti rebukes this 
convenient self-perpetuated rhetoric and claims that Uber is indeed a “post-industrial 
corporation” whose “technology (as well as its power) appears to have lowered the costs of firm 
coordination relative to market coordination by reducing agency costs and enabling Uber to 
direct production inputs without assuming the costs of formal property rights” (Tomassetti 2016, 
7). In this diagnosis, Tomassetti directly links Uber’s misclassification of drivers, a major source 
of the company’s cost mitigation, to regulatory arbitrage, which is a core tenet of post-industrial 
corporate identity.  
From Tomassetti’s analysis, it may be natural to conclude that pursuing the 
reclassification of gig workers’ employment status, whether it be via legislation or litigation, is 
the best way to mitigate the social ills being produced by the Gig Economy’s labor practices. 
Despite the argument that worker reclassification would theoretically eliminate a majority of the 
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precarity associated with gig work, the actual track record of pursuing reclassification through 
litigation has been rather mixed, as is outlined in Veena Dubal’s “Winning the Battle, Losing the 
War? Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy.” 
Dubal’s analysis is based upon three case studies of successful class action worker 
misclassification lawsuits. In each of these case studies, Dubal finds that despite a favorable 
outcome in the courtroom, the reclassified workers’ overall situations did not necessarily 
improve and in some cases became even more precarious (Dubal 2017, 740). While she 
acknowledges the role that reclassification litigation plays as a deterrent by drawing public 
attention to misclassification and dissuading firms form embracing the independent contractor 
model, Dubal’s finds the efficacy of such litigation detrimentally limited by the structural power 
imbalance that exists between employers and their workers (Dubal 2017, 746-747). While two of 
the defendant corporations threatened their employees with blacklists and replacement workers if 
they attempted to follow through with reclassification, the third modified its entire business 
model to make its drivers seem less like employees (Dubal 2017, 747). This sort of ​post-facto 
maneuvering on the part of corporations is proof, Dubal claims, that “misclassification litigation 
must be leveraged alongside other forms of political and legal activism that are attendant to 
worker self-visions and that build and nurture collective worker power” (Dubal 2017, 748).  
Navigating the vast power discrepancies that exist between gig economy companies and 
their independently contracted workers necessitates, as Dubal argues, a multifaceted analytical 
approach. To this end, there has been a great deal of research dedicated to many aspects of this 
phenomenon, including many of the pieces included in this literature review. The works of Isaac, 
Rushkoff and Stone illuminate the role that influential individual actors, namely corporate 
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executives and investors, play in both the creation and justification of these power discrepancies. 
The underlying ethos that informs these actors’ rhetorical and business strategies is outlined by 
Morozov, Castells and Turner. The theoretical appeal of such strategies, which include labor 
force decentralization and co-optation of communalist ideals for corporate ends, is chronicled in 
the works of Benkler, Schor and Fitzmaurice, and Rosenblat and Calo, which are in direct 
conversation with O'Neil, Lee and Rosenblat’s analyses of algorithmic management’s impacts on 
workers. These respective topics point toward a thorny reality for regulators and gig workers 
alike, a reality which Dubal, Malos and Lewchuk analyze the contours of in hopes of fostering 
truly impactful policy change. 
What the existing literature does not explicitly cover, however, is the ways by which gig 
economy companies have been able to leverage their corporate identities, largely through their 
formal corporate communications with regulators and consumers, in their opposition to attempts 
at regulating their labor practices. Such an inquiry combines elements of all the aforementioned 
areas of analysis, namely how these companies fuse their technological capacity and 
decentralized business models with the wider silicon valley techno-positivist ethos to create 
corporate identities and implement patterns of corporate communication that inform their 
opposition to regulation of their labor practices. The forthcoming research intends to add to this 
robust and rapidly growing body of literature by addressing this very question through a case 
study of Uber’s corporate identity and communications. Uber’s driver, rider and regulator-facing 
communications are of particular importance in this analysis, as they are the primary vehicles 
through which widespread public consent regarding their labor practices is manufactured. To be 
sure, gauging the full extent of Uber’s corporate identity and its impact on regulatory attempts 
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would include analyses of its legal defenses in employment misclassification and wage theft 
lawsuits as well as the company’s lobbying efforts, two avenues of inquiry that my research does 
not discuss at length but aims to complement. The ultimate goal of this research is to provide 
insight that will contextualize Uber’s corporate communication strategies in hopes of fostering a 
more critical and nuanced understanding of the systems that the company has gone to such 
extreme lengths to mystify. 
 
4.​ Methods 
The previous portion of this research demonstrated the importance of investigating how 
Uber’s corporate identity has informed its attempts at avoiding the regulation of its labor 
practices. In this section, I will explain the methods by which I attempted to answer my research 
question, which include theoretical analysis of a selection of the company’s official 
communications and a survey of drivers who received messaging from Uber regarding AB5. I 
chose these methods because of their ability to provide insight into the underlying assumptions 
of Uber’s anti-regulatory messaging, what the messaging reveals about Uber’s desired external 
and internal identities and, ultimately, the efficacy of this messaging.  
The vast majority of my findings regarding Uber’s corporate identity and its influence on 
the company’s campaign against AB5 were generated through a theoretical analysis of a 
selection of the company’s official communications. These communications span roughly the 
same length of time as the company’s ongoing campaign against AB5, which began shortly after 
the California Supreme Court’s May 2018 ruling in ​Dynamex Operations West Inc. v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles.​ ​According to the California Employment Development Department, the 
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“ABC” test that ​Dynamex ​established and AB5 codified into California law requires employers 
to classify workers who do not fulfill all of the following criteria as employees rather than 
independent contractors. 
 
A: The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the 
performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact. 
 
B:The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business 
C:The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed. 
 
A significant amount of the information I based my findings on came from Uber’s 
various city and state-specific blogs. I visited four such blogs in an effort to locate the company’s 
announcements of the various products it debuted and companies it acquired during the period of 
time leading up to its initial public offering in May 2019 through January 2020. From these blog 
posts, I analyzed the company’s rhetoric regarding these expansions while assessing its attempts 
at diversifying its business model. To find the company’s messaging on its acquisition of the 
e-scooter and e-bike company Jump, the debut of Uber Money as well as the announcement of a 
$1 billion investment in its Autonomous Vehicle Group, I searched the company’s most general 
blog, which is called “Uber Newsroom.” The company’s post regarding the launch of Uber 
Copter was posted in its New York City-specific blog, while its California blog hosted the two 
posts regarding the slate of changes in terms of driver administration announced in the 
immediate aftermath of AB5. Finally, the announcement of a feature available in certain cities 
that allows users to “see nearby public transit stops and real-time departure information” is 
located in it’s US-wide blog.  
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In addition to Uber’s official blog posts, I examined its Initial Public Offering Prospectus, 
a document filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in preparation for the 
company’s initial public offering in May 2019. IPO Prospectuses are meant to be comprehensive 
accounts of the filing company’s history, assets, business plan, growth projections and potential 
risk factors that serve as a reference for potential investors and regulators alike. Due to its 
expansive and official nature, Uber’s IPO prospectus provides perhaps the purest distillation of 
what the company’s executives consider its relations with its drivers to be, as well as their 
assessment of the risks posed by labor legislation that would reclassify the company’s drivers as 
employees. My analysis of this document focused on areas wherein the company discussed the 
role that it believes drivers play in the company’s overall structure, with a particular emphasis on 
the financial risk that driver-reclassifying legislation like AB5 poses as well as the company’s 
attempt at minimizing drivers’ centrality to its business model and growth projections.  
While the company’s IPO Prospectus represents a relatively sober and unvarnished 
account of its relationship with its drivers, two types of its public-facing communications 
produced in the immediate wake of AB5’s passage depict a more curated version of this reality. 
The first of these communications is a conference call set up by the company’s chief counsel 
Tony West and its California public policy director Davis Webb to debrief local and national 
journalists on the company’s initial response to the law’s passage while providing a general 
outline of the company’s planned response to California’s shifting regulatory environment. 
Roughly three months after AB5’s passage, Uber joined a group of its fellow TNCs in 
sponsoring a piece of legislation that aims to solidify their workers’ classification as independent 
contractors called the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act.” My analysis of this act, 
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however, centered on the messaging of the promotional campaign surrounding it rather than the 
Act itself. This decision was born of the notion that the messages by which Uber attempts to 
court support for this act are more representative of its desired public-facing corporate identity 
than the bill’s actual text. In particular, I focused my analysis on a collection of 71 “driver 
stories,” or testimonials from California-based drivers regarding their preference to remain 
independent contractors rather than employees. In order to uncover any recurring themes in these 
testimonials that may indicate a specific narrative being promoted by Uber, I read (and watched, 
as some of the testimonials were in video form) all 71 testimonials while categorizing them 
based on their thematic content. Specifically, I tallied the economic, social and personal reasons 
why each of the featured drivers preferred independent contractor status, drivers’ perceptions 
about their relationship to their work with Uber, and what aspect of driving they seemed to value 
the most.  
To serve as a control group for this experiment, I conducted a similar analysis on a 
selection of 62 “driver stories” videos found on Uber’s official YouTube page. These videos, 
which were released between 2014 and 2019 and have amassed over 9.3 million views, ​span 
multiple campaigns, issue areas and locations, thus providing a less case-specific depiction of 
Uber’s corporate identity. The considerable breadth in content included in this set of videos 
provides a representative baseline from which to analyze Uber’s desired corporate identity in 
regards to its relationship with its drivers. Upon conducting this analysis, I tallied the number of 
videos with common themes from Uber’s YouTube page and the “Protect App Based Drivers 
and Services” website and compared the dominant themes of each set. Through this comparison, 
I was able to detect significant variations between Uber’s messaging in the context of a political 
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campaign and in the various other contexts that were exemplified in its YouTube “driver 
stories.”  
In order to gain additional insight into my analysis, the order in which I observed these 
two series must be noted as well. I watched all 62 of the YouTube “driver stories” first, with 
virtually no prior knowledge of their thematic content other than what I could gather from the 
titles and thumbnail images. This decision was based in large part due to my intention of having 
the YouTube “driver stories” act as a control group for the “Protect App Based Drivers and 
Services” testimonials. By watching all 62 YouTube “driver stories” before exposing myself to 
any aspect of the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” website, I was able to engage with 
the content of the YouTube videos with minimal bias and temptation to search for narratives 
where they might not truly exist.  
The fact that both the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials and Uber’s 
YouTube page are both funded and operated by Uber itself makes these sources more reliable 
indicators of the company’s desired narrative of its labor relations than of actual driver sentiment 
toward the company. In order to more accurately gauge drivers’ unvarnished opinions regarding 
AB5 as well as Uber’s attempts at influencing drivers’ opinions on the issue of their employment 
classification, I created and disseminated an online survey using Google Forms, a web-based 
survey creation application. The survey primarily focused on drivers’ responses to Uber’s tactic 
of sending messages directly to drivers regarding their classification and “maintaining 
flexibility” during the summer of 2019. The survey was divided into five sections: demographic 
information, information on the frequency, content and format of messages drivers received from 
Uber, drivers’ thoughts on the appropriateness of employers sending political messaging to their 
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workers and drivers’ opinions on AB5 specifically. In order to maintain anonymity, respondents 
were not asked for any information that would identify themselves and all questions asking for 
demographic information were optional. A complete list of the questions included in the survey 
can be found in Appendix A. Featuring a mixture of multiple choice, free response and five-point 
sliding scale question formats, the survey takes roughly ten minutes to complete if none of the 
optional questions are skipped. 
My strategy for disseminating the survey included outreach to drivers through online 
driver forums and social media pages. Getting the link to my survey posted onto such sites, 
however, was a multi-step process. For security and moderation concerns, many of the online 
driver forums I encountered were closed non-drivers and had application processes for 
prospective members. Being a non-driver myself, I explained my situation and intentions to the 
administrators of each group before formally requesting entrance. Thankfully, I received warm 
and welcoming responses from virtually all group administrators and members alike. I was 
ultimately granted entry into seven driver Facebook groups - all of which set up for 
California-based drivers specifically - with a total of 51,034 members between them as well as 
the California-specific forum on the popular driver site “UberPeople.Net,” which does not 
disclose the number of active members on a given forum. While the survey was live, from 
January 23, 2020 until March 1, 2020,  I posted a standardized message to each of the 
aforementioned groups either three or four times, so as to not inundate the groups with my 
messaging. The three groups that I was granted access to after my survey went live were those 
that I sent three rather than four messages to. In addition to this method of outreach, I also 
contacted Harry Campbell, known more commonly as “the Rideshare Guy,” for assistance with 
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disseminating my survey. Campbell, who is one of the most prominent, respected and prolific 
rideshare industry experts in the US, agreed to include a link to my survey in his driver 
newsletter that has an audience of over 60,000 people.  
As a result of this multifaceted outreach effort, my survey received 40 responses during 
the five week dissemination period. This number is significantly lower than what would be 
necessary to produce statistically significant results or represent an accurate cross section of all 
drivers in California. However, I contend that conducting a survey in this manner was the most 
effective plausible outreach strategy given the financial, time, and capacity constraints I faced 
throughout the research process. Although conducting interviews would have allowed me to 
attain more detailed insight into individual drivers’ experiences and opinions regarding AB5, it 
would have been extremely difficult if not impossible to reach the same number of drivers 
through this method as I was able to with a survey. The value judgement to prioritize the number 
of responses over the ultimate quality and length of individual responses was not an easy one to 
reach, but I maintain that it produced the most useful results possible given my own capacity and 
circumstances.  
At the point in time that I initially disseminated the driver survey, I intended on 
researching both Uber and Lyfts’ anti-regulatory campaigns through the lens of their corporate 
identities. Due to the fact that I did not decide to decrease the scope of my research until after the 
initial publication of the survey, a portion of its respondents drive for Lyft in addition to or 
instead of Uber, and my initial round of outreach was toward online driver forums for both 
companies’ drivers. In the interest of time, I was inclined to continue conducting the survey with 
both Uber and Lyft drivers as respondents rather than re-formatting and distributing the survey a 
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second time solely for Uber drivers. While Uber and Lyft indeed harbor myriad differences in 
terms of corporate identity and public persona, their business models and systems of labor 
administration are markedly similar, as is evidenced by the fact that almost all online driver 
forums that I encountered during the survey process included drivers for both companies who 
seemingly shared stories, advice and questions across company lines with relative ease.  
In many regards, the histories, business practices and corporate identities of Uber and 
Lyft, its primary competitor in the TNC space, are inseperable. The two companies were 
launched around the same time and thrived in the same economic environment while attempting 
to solve the same problem using similar technologies and business models. This research was 
initially intended to analyze the corporate identities of both companies, but due to an array of 
considerations discussed below, I have decided to proceed with an analysis of Uber’s corporate 
identity only. The primary reason for this decision is the two companies’ considerable 
similarities that range from their labor practices to their marketing campaigns. Most important 
among these similarities, however, is their unflinching and often collaborative resistance toward 
any meaningful regulation of their labor practices. Not only are the two companies’ interests 
united due to their ostensibly identical business models, they have actively joined forces in a 
number of anti-regulation campaigns, most notably the “Protect App Based Drivers and 
Services” campaign in opposition to AB5. Analyzing these practices separately for each 
company would likely lead to many redundant findings and analysis that would not necessarily 
serve to propel the conversation forward in a way that an analysis of Uber alone could not. 
Despite these myriad similarities, there is one factor that sets Uber apart from not only 
Lyft but the rest of its competitors as well: the level of scrutiny it receives from the media and 
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populace as a whole. Much of this negative attention has been self-inflicted due to the brazenness 
of co-founder and ex-CEO Travis Kalanick and the hostile, misogynist culture he cultivated at 
the company. However, it has also had the effect of deflecting a great deal of largely-deserved 
scrutiny away from Lyft despite the two companies ostensibly identical labor practices and 
business models. Perhaps due to the enhanced visibility that Uber has garnered due to its 
notoriously unsavory founder and internal culture, the vast majority of researchers, journalists 
and academics who study TNCs and their impact on workers focus their inquiries on Uber 
specifically. It has become increasingly apparent throughout this research process that, for better 
or worse, the most vibrant and prescient conversations taking place about this industry are 
focusing exclusively on Uber. In hopes of making a contribution to this discourse, I’ve decided 
to follow this path.  
To be sure, the issue of time also plays a role in my decision to shift my focus away from 
Lyft and toward Uber. Given the constrained timeline on which I conducted this research, I 
believe that limiting my inquiry to one company allowed me to conduct a more nuanced and 
profound analysis of that company as opposed to hasty or incomplete analyses of two very 
similar companies. 
 
5. ​Findings and Analysis 
a. Conflating Efficiency-Seeking with Progressivism 
The foundation of Uber’s corporate identity - which has animated the company’s 
attempts at avoiding regulation from its early days dodging local transportation officials in San 
Francisco to its high profile, multi-million dollar campaigns against state level labor legislation - 
  
60 
is its self-identification as a tech company rather than as a taxi company. This crucial distinction 
has not only established the underlying logic for the company’s legal and rhetorical arguments 
against the reclassification of its drivers, it communicates specific and advantageous messages 
about the company’s overall ethos as well. Particularly, this tactic positions Uber’s operations 
and ethos as progressive and innovation-oriented. Such a depiction is rooted in long-standing, 
widely accepted characterizations of Silicon Valley’s most prominent tech firms as ceaselessly 
utilizing cutting edge technology to upend, or “disrupt,” traditional power structures and 
institutional arrangements in pursuit of maximizing systemic efficiency. While profit incentive 
undoubtedly lies at the core of all corporate decision-making across time, location and industry, 
tech companies like Uber have popularized staggeringly effective rhetorical strategies to blunt 
the unsavory nature of their goals. Such strategies, which Uber’s adoption of will be discussed at 
length in this section, focus on the non-economic benefits of prioritizing efficiency and 
disrupting existing systems, often by framing such systems as corrupt (or corruptible), 
unresponsive, and undemocratic.  
Uber’s corporate rhetoric aims to establish a stark contrast between itself and the taxi 
industry it has largely replaced. By aligning itself with vague but widely agreeable ideals like 
progress and modernity, Uber not only paints the taxi industry as diametrically opposed to such 
ideals but attributes a non-economic character to the company’s practices. This contrast was 
expressed often during Uber’s initial rise to prominence, oftentimes by the company’s 
co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick. A particularly telling and widely-circulated example of 
such a declaration is Kalanick’s likening his company’s mission to a political campaign in which 
“the candidate is Uber and the opponent is an assh*** named Taxi. Nobody likes him, he’s not a 
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nice character, but he’s so woven into the political machinery and fabric that a lot of people owe 
him favors” (Isaac 2019, 81-82). He would go on to liken taxi companies to “cartels” in 
subsequent rants, never leaving his disdain for the industry up to question (Isaac 2019, 114). For 
a time, Kalanick’s sentiments were widely accepted and echoed in the news media, as is 
exemplified in a 2014 Chicago Tribune piece by Steve Chapman. In that piece, Chapman 
similarly positioned the city’s taxi companies as a “cartel” and mimicked Uber’s 
customer-centric ethos in the piece’s final line: “​The (taxi) industry has had its way for decades. 
It's time to put consumers in the driver's seat” (Chapman 2014).  
Generally, the younger, cosmopolitan rider demographic that Uber’s services attract is 
prone to embrace products and services (and by extension the companies that produce them) that 
seem to exhibit the very progressive, forward-thinking ethos that they believe to embody 
themselves. Understanding this, Uber has tailored its corporate communication to commonly 
include such rhetoric. The examples of this are numerous and include, most prominently, 
references to the company’s labor practices as “the future of independent work” in its IPO 
prospectus, chief counsel Tony West referring to a company policy platform as “progressive” 
and “geared toward the 21st century economy” and a piece of company-sponsored legislation 
that situates the company’s controversial labor practices as “the modern economy” (S-1 2019, 
93; “Press Call” 2019, 2; “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act,” 2). These rhetorical 
choices endow Uber’s labor practices and overall business model with an air of inevitability, as 
they implicitly tie these practices to unavoidable, undeniable phenomena like the passage of 
time. Under such logic, the opposite implication applies to taxi companies. If Uber’s business 
model is “geared toward the 21st century economy” and its executives have explicitly named the 
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taxi industry as the company’s chief adversary, taxi companies become cast as entities unfit to 
serve modern societal needs.  
Appeals to such widely accepted and highly regarded ideals, especially when they are 
effectively employed as they have been in Uber’s case, force regulators into making exceedingly 
difficult choices regarding how to approach regulating the companies that claim to pursue these 
ideals. ​Anti-regulatory appeals based upon innovation and progressivism, regardless of their 
earnestness, are impactful due to the potentially damaging political implications for those 
regulators and elected officials who reject such appeals. Namely, regulators and politicians who 
are skeptical of or reject such appeals do so at the risk of being portrayed by Uber and its allies 
as status quoists who prefer the outdated, corrupt taxi system over the new, democratic and 
efficient TNC model. ​If they do choose to pursue meaningful regulation, they risk being painted 
as complacent, hostile to innovation, or worse, corrupt. If they take a hands-off approach, they 
not only shirk their core responsibilities as agents of public service, but they risk allowing and 
even incentivizing a litany of labor violations, financial improprieties, and public safety hazards. 
The fashioning of corporate identity through conflating Uber’s newfangled business 
model with cultural and economic progressivism is exemplified in a series of comments made by 
Uber’s chief counsel Tony West during a September 2019 conference call with the press 
discussing AB5’s impacts on the company’s operations. Throughout this call, West repeatedly 
referred to Uber as a “progressive company,” even going as far as conflating it with California’s 
“progressivism” as a state and his belief “as a Californian that California can always lead the 
nation, especially when it comes to innovative solutions” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 5). Through 
this rhetorical tactic, West is attempting to accomplish two things. First, he is pressuring 
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legislators to “prove” their bonafides as politicians that embody the state’s progressive reputation 
by supporting Uber’s “progressive” alternative to AB5. In doing so, West is also attempting to 
embed Uber’s own corporate identity into California’s reputation as a progressive state in pursuit 
of a more favorable regulatory environment. While these claims are not patently false, they are 
nonetheless a prime example of attributing cultural or personal characteristics to a corporate 
entity in efforts to prevent regulation and manufacture consent. The regulatory calculus that this 
rhetoric invites becomes even more fraught when public opinion comes into consideration, an 
addition that Uber not only welcomes but has a history of actively courting. Messaging that 
similarly positioned AB5 - and by extension the politicians who supported it - as regressive 
could be found in dozens of smaller local papers throughout California around the time of the 
bill’s passage. A prime example of such rhetoric being perpetuated through news media is an 
article syndicated in a number of commonly-owned local news outlets across California in 
September 2019 which states that “AB5 will restrict drivers’ freedom by imposing an outdated 
employment status model on a new, innovative, and expanding sector of the economy” (Wilford 
2019). 
As is the case with many aspects of Uber’s foundational corporate identity, this 
antagonism toward regulatory authority fashioned as technocratic, pseudo-populist 
empowerment came straight from the mind of Travis Kalanick. This stance can be whittled down 
to a supremely revelatory quote given by Kalanick during a 2011 interview with the tech 
industry-focused podcast “This Week in Startups,” in which he states “our product is so superior 
to the status quo that if we give people the opportunity to see it or try it, in any place in the world 
where government has to be at least somewhat responsive to the people, they will demand it and 
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defend its right to exist” (This Week in Startups, 2011). This sentiment, which became known by 
those within the company’s corporate structure as “Travis’ Law,” came to define Uber’s growth 
strategy and would eventually play a pivotal role in its anti-regulatory advocacy as well (Stone 
2018, 195). In order to achieve such a level of customer loyalty, however, the company first 
needed to develop a product that would elicit not only high levels of customer satisfaction but 
reliance upon the company as well. Thus, creating a customer experience that was as “seamless, 
easy and enjoyable” as possible became a core concern for Kalanick and his cohort of coders, 
marketers, executives and salespeople, with Kalanick even announcing “customer obsession” as 
one of the company’s fourteen guiding principles in a 2015 internal presentation (Isaac 2019, 
9-10).  
In this mission, Uber has been undeniably successful. In comparison to traditional taxi 
services, the Uber customer experience is widely seen as an upgrade in terms of reliability and 
efficiency. The issue with this logic emerges when Uber’s proprietary technologies, which 
produce part of its competitive advantage over traditional taxi services, are marketed as the ​only 
source of such advantage. Thus, the fact that the company’s myriad acts of regulatory arbitrage - 
stealing trade secrets, misclassifying workers and systemically enabling a combative and hostile 
workplace culture - have also played a role in securing these advantages, is largely obscured 
from public view and erased from Uber’s corporate identity (Wakabayashi 2018; Farviar 2019; 
Tait 2020). The effectiveness of this messaging is based upon the deep-seated belief that 
technological innovation inevitably breeds increasingly favorable outcomes of both economic 
and social variety, a belief that dovetails with broader progressive ideology in such a way that 
innovation’s unsavory implications and potential applications come to seem negligible. In his 
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theory of technological solutionism, Evgeny Morozov posits that this sort of single-minded 
pursuit of efficiency is prone to mischaracterizing inefficient aspects of preexisting structures as 
problematic when, in practice, they may be in place to achieve any number of non 
efficiency-based goals (Morozov 2013, 9-10). By this logic, some of the “inefficiencies” Uber 
was attempting to eliminate from the traditional taxi model, namely long wait times, 
comprehensive driver background checks and cash payment, at once negatively impacted 
systemic efficiency but were beneficial in other regards like drivers’ economic stability and the 
system’s overall safety.  
Despite its rhetorical efficacy, the goal of maximizing customer convenience is actually 
at odds with another of Uber’s other expressed corporate values. One of the company’s most 
common defenses of its labor practices is its insistence that a vast majority of its drivers work 
part time, thus exempting the company from classifying drivers as full time employees and 
taking on the additional responsibilities that come with that classification. However, a 2016 
study by UCLA Law Professor Noah Zatz found that it was not Uber’s large pool of part time 
and hobbyist drivers that allowed the company to achieve the level of customer satisfaction and 
systemic efficiency it so fervently pursued, but the portion of their workforce that drove more 
than 15 hours per week (Zatz 2016). Specifically, Zatz’s study found that drivers who work more 
than 15 hours per week, while only making up 49% of the company’s driver workforce, provided 
81% of its total rides. (Zatz 2016). Therefore, the maintenance of the company’s standard of 
efficiency and by extension customer satisfaction is at odds with its continued insistence that part 
time and hobbyist drivers are the core of its workforce. While the conflation of 
technologically-enabled change with societal progress and prioritization of customer satisfaction 
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may have served to quell popular concern with Uber’s employment practices and overall growth 
strategy, the ways that the company ultimately focused this broad base of customer support and 
reliance are even more revelatory of its corporate identity. 
To be sure, the primary goal of Uber’s unflinching pursuit of customer satisfaction and 
reliance through appeals to progressive ideals and maximizing systemic efficiency is to generate 
as much revenue as possible, as is the case for all corporations. A key byproduct of these 
pursuits, however, has been Uber’s ability to leverage customers’ reliance on their services into 
political support in its myriad regulatory battles. Essentially an extension of “Travis’ Law,” this 
tactic has been a tenet of the company’s ethos from its beginning, but was fashioned into a 
formidable weapon with the hiring Ben Metcalfe, who would eventually lead the company’s 
“Public Policy Innovation Team” (Isaac 2019, 117). A self-described builder of “custom tools to 
support citizen engagement across legislative matters” to drive “social good and social change,” 
Metcalfe and his team built tools within the rider version of the Uber app that notified users of 
legislative matters that could jeopardize Uber’s operations in a given city (Isaac 2019, 117). With 
the push of a button, riders could send messages or sign online petitions expressing their 
opposition to such legislation, constituting a new form of digitally-enabled, low-information, 
low-effort issue advocacy. What further incited such fervent support among customers was 
Uber’s known willingness to completely abandon markets the company deemed insufficiently 
amenable to its business and labor practices, as it did with Austin, Texas in 2016 (Kelly 2016). 
The efficacy of mobilizing political support from customers through in-app messaging has been 
staggering, as the company amassed 450,000 signatures by 2015, a mere five months after 
Metcalfe’s hiring (Helderman 2014). Aside from the sheer amount of support this tactic has been 
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able to garner, its quasi-grassroots nature serves to reinforce the very progressive, 
people-powered identity that Uber has long sought to establish for itself. This seemingly 
overwhelming popular support becomes additionally problematic, however, when one considers 
the manner by which Uber initially drew customers to its platform. 
 To accompany its technology-based competitive advantage, Uber’s original operations 
manager Austin Geidt devised a “rollout playbook” which outlined the company’s strategy of 
attracting business by flooding a city’s market with considerably valuable coupons, sign-up 
bonuses and various other incentives aimed at both potential drivers and riders (Lashinsky 2015). 
This allowed the company to rapidly build up both its ridership and driver supply, oftentimes 
before local transportation officials were even aware of the company’s presence in their city or 
the illegality of its practices. By the time officials became privy to Uber’s operations and 
prepared to penalize the company for its lawlessness, Uber had built up sufficient goodwill 
amongst its drivers and riders to get them to advocate on its behalf. Once this “playbook” 
produced concessions in one locality, Geidt “systematized the approach on an internal company 
Wikipedia-like page, creating a playbook for city launches. Send in a launch team to Seattle, San 
Antonio, Chicago - wherever - have them follow the playbook, and watch the demand flywheel 
begin to spin” (Isaac 2019, 63). A scaled-up version of this “playbook” and its underlying logic 
of weaponizing customer satisfaction into political support has guided Uber through a number of 
its more recent and higher-stakes regulatory battles, which the following section of this research 
will discuss in greater depth. 
It is important, however, to first reflect upon the implications of Uber’s tactic of 
weaponizing customer satisfaction and reliance on their product into political support. Much like 
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the company’s vague yet effective appeals to its identification with progressive ideals, its 
weaponization of customers’ satisfaction presents a vexing dilemma to the regulators and 
legislators who are the targets of these supporters’ appeals. Popular outcry, regardless of its 
authenticity or origins, cannot simply go unexamined or overlooked by serious, well-intentioned 
public servants. When responding to this popular outcry means ignoring claims of worker 
misclassification and defiance of local transportation laws, however, officials must choose 
whether to prioritize the satisfaction of a sizable and vocal subset of constituents or keep with 
their statutory responsibilities as regulators. A byproduct of Uber’s singular focus on achieving 
customer satisfaction via systemic efficiency is the company’s tendency to whittle its regulatory 
battles down to similarly stark, binary terms. In other words, what is truly a multi-faceted issue 
that encompasses labor policy, traffic systems, and public safety is, through such customer 
mobilization, oversimplified into a consumer issue alone. While consumer preference and 
convenience is important - especially when a service as fundamental as transportation is in 
question - its overemphasis in this case obscures other key interests at play including proper 
worker classification and adherence to established safety standards. Obscuring and marginalizing 
the myriad implications of regulating an entity like Uber ultimately serves to undermine 
concerns regarding the working conditions of the company’s drivers, thus reifying the 
company’s own prioritization of its largely bourgeoise customer base over its working-class 
drivers and adopting the same class-based prioritization on a governmentally-recognized level.  
Such weaponization of customer support is but one of the many tactics Uber is known to 
employ in efforts to fashion a favorable corporate identity and avoid the regulation of its labor 
practices, virtually all of which have been included in the company’s multi-pronged campaign in 
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opposition to AB5. The various tactics of this campaign, as well as how they reflect and intersect 
with different aspects of Uber’s corporate identity, will be discussed at length in the following 
case study.  
 
b. Case Study: Uber’s Anti-AB5 Campaign 
Before an analysis of the various strategies that Uber has employed in its efforts to 
prevent the passage of AB5 can be conducted, it is necessary to provide context for the uniquely 
contentious nature of the fight over AB5’s passage and enforcement. At the core of this 
contention are, unsurprisingly, massive financial considerations, as California accounted for 
roughly 17% of Uber’s total revenue in the US as of May 2019 (Griswold 2019). The potential 
reclassification of the company’s California-based drivers as employees, which is a 
commonly-anticipated outcome of AB5’s passage, would significantly increase the company’s 
operating costs in the state, delivering a considerable blow to its already shaky financial outlook. 
Common estimates of the additional costs for employers associated with utilizing employee 
rather than independent contract labor range from 20-30%, largely due to employers’ obligation 
to provide certain non-wage benefits to their employees. A 2019 study commissioned by 
Barclays attempted to quantify the additional costs Uber would incur upon the reclassification of 
its California-based drivers more exactly, its findings reiterating the massive financial stakes of 
AB5’s passage and ultimate enforcement. Specifically, the Barclays study found that accounting 
for the additional benefits, and taxes would cost Uber $3,625 per driver annually (Griswold 
2019). Based on Barclays’ estimate that the company has 140,000 drivers in California, the total 
cost of reclassification would amount to a staggering $508 million (Griswold 2019). 
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The short term financial impact of AB5’s passage seemed similarly dire, as the bill’s path 
through the California State Legislature coincided almost directly with Uber’s Initial Public 
Offering, which took place on May 10, 2019. As was explicitly stated in Uber’s IPO prospectus, 
ongoing uncertainty regarding the employment status of the company’s drivers is one of the most 
significant risks the company faces on its path toward profitability, and news of a law that could 
reclassify drivers as employees in the company’s largest US market likely did little to quell 
potential investors’ fears of such a risk  (S-1 2019, 28).  To be sure, Uber’s disappointing IPO - 
which saw the company’s stock price fall by 7.6% on its first day of public trading, lowering its 
total valuation from estimates of nearing of $120 billion to $75.65 billion - was also caused by 
larger market forces including rising trade-based tensions between the US and China and Lyft’s 
similarly poor IPO performance two months prior (Feiner 2019). However, ongoing concerns 
over the driver classification question accentuated by the AB5’s movement through the 
California Legislature surely contributed to the stock’s poor initial performance as well.  In 
tandem with the financial implications that animated Uber’s actions against AB5, the 
maintenance of corporate prestige was likely a significant motivation as well. The financial blow 
dealt by AB5 would arguably be compounded by the unfavorable optics of Uber’s home state, 
which also contains the very first market the company entered, rebuking a central tenet of the 
company’s business model.  
Uber’s efforts to prevent AB5’s passage throughout Summer 2019, while the bill was 
making its way through the California State Assembly and Senate, were threefold. Perhaps the 
most ambitious and publicly impactful of Uber’s tactics was the package of internal reforms it 
proposed to California lawmakers as an alternative to legislation that would reclassify the 
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company’s drivers. The proposal included scaled-down versions of many of the benefits that 
employee status would afford drivers including on-the-job injury protections, health benefits and 
a wage floor, but maintained drivers’ status as independent contractors. Although it did not 
successfully prevent AB5’s passage or lead to Uber receiving an exemption from the law’s 
“ABC” test for employment status, many of the proposal’s provisions found their way into a 
piece of Uber-sponsored legislation called the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act,” 
which aims to firmly establish the company’s drivers as independent contractors. The specific 
provisions of “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act” and its insights into Uber’s 
corporate identity will be discussed at length in the following section of this analysis, as it 
constitutes a major part of Uber’s anti-regulatory strategy.  
This counter-proposal, which was first announced to the public in September 2019, was 
positioned by Uber’s spokespeople as a symbol of good faith and a desire to compromise with 
regulators. This intent was made abundantly clear in the company’s communications in the 
immediate wake of AB5’s passage, in which chief counsel Tony West remarked “we’ll continue 
to advocate for a compromise agreement and we were encouraged by Governor Newsom’s 
comments as reported by the Wall Street Journal this morning that he’s fully committed to 
negotiating a solution” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 4). This corporate identity-building tactic of 
appealing to compromise and cooperation in an effort to come across as level-headed and 
amenable to criticism was likely geared toward winning the favor of the general public rather 
than lawmakers specifically, as Uber’s counter-proposal was made public with only one week 
left in the 2019 legislative calendar. Sentiments aligned with West’s rhetoric in the post-AB5 
press call cropped up in opinion columns of newspapers throughout California around the time of 
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AB5’s passage, as is exemplified in an August 2019 ​Sacramento Bee ​opinion column in which 
the author argues that “​legislators are uniquely positioned to protect flexible, on-demand work 
while simultaneously improving work quality and security. That is, as long as they take seriously 
the recent path forward jointly offered up by the leaders of Lyft and ​Uber​” (Leroe-Munoz 2019). 
In the very same series of remarks, West denied that the company engaged in any 
closed-door lobbying of state legislators in opposition to AB5, adding that company did not 
formally oppose the bill until its final round of amendments was announced, seemingly 
reiterating the company’s commitment to maintaining the visage of a cordial and collaborative 
relationship with its regulators (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 9). According to the California 
Secretary of State Cal-Access Lobbying Archives, however, Uber did in fact engage in extensive 
lobbying in the first three quarters of 2019, spending $549,513 to lobby legislators on a total of 
15 different senate and assembly bills including AB5 (California Secretary of State, n.d.). 
Though the exact contents of these lobbying efforts are unknown to the public, the fact that 
Uber’ counter-proposal was circulated with one week remaining in the year’s legislative session 
lends to the notion that a majority of the company’s AB5-related lobbying did not concern this 
proposal (Said 2019). It is considerably more likely that these efforts, given their relatively 
long-term nature, were geared toward securing “ABC” test exemptions for TNCs and convincing 
legislators to oppose the bill in its entirety. Regardless of their exact contents, the fact that these 
efforts were vehemently denied by Uber’s primary spokesperson in the very same public 
statement in which he championed the company’s cooperative and transparent approach to 
engaging regulators points to an incongruity between the company’s desired corporate identity 
and its actual approach toward lobbying and engaging with regulators more generally.  
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Accompanying the company’s lobbying of state legislators was its incessant courting of 
driver opposition to AB5. This strategy centered on the oft-used tactic of sending messages and 
action items directly to drivers’ apps, which both Uber and Lyft did repeatedly throughout 
Summer 2019 (Ghaffary 2019). These messages, which consisted of vague appeals to “protecting 
driver flexibility” and never referred to AB5 by name, received very little attention from the 
media, with only a handful of industry specific publications and driver-focused blogs reporting 
substantively on this intriguing development (Ghaffary 2019). Though Uber has employed 
similar tactics aimed at its riders with considerable success in previous instances, there is little 
available data on the efficacy of such messaging when aimed toward drivers. 
In order to more comprehensively understand these efforts, I conducted a survey of 40 
California-based drivers, gauging their opinions on the efficacy and appropriateness of such 
messaging, as well as their general thoughts on companies sending political messaging to their 
employees more generally. To be sure, the number of drivers surveyed is too small to be a 
statistically significant depiction of California’s overall driver population, but I contend that this 
format allowed me to contact a higher number of drivers than individually-administered 
substantive interviews would have. Further, it is important to note that the survey was also open 
to Lyft drivers, as the survey was designed and initially disseminated before the scope of this 
research was limited to Uber. The selection of responding drivers was slightly skewed by the 
method that the survey was administered, which was through online driver forums and social 
media groups. Of the 40 respondents, 54% have been driving for at least 3 years and 58% drive 
at least 30 hours per week, representing a considerably longer overall tenure and larger workload 
than Uber’s own reports on driver habits designate. This skew toward long-term, full-time 
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drivers is reflective of the subpopulation of drivers who are most active on online driver forums 
and social media groups, as they are likely more inclined to value and utilize the information 
shared on these groups - which runs the gamut from income maximization strategies to 
discussions on company policy to sharing stories about ill-behaved passengers - than new 
drivers, part-timers, or hobbyists.  
According to respondents, Uber and Lyfts’ outreach attempts were incessant, as 39% of 
drivers claimed to have received 5 or more messages from their respective TNC throughout 
summer 2019. Though an additional 30% of respondents were unsure how many messages they 
received, the fact that more drivers reported receiving 5 messages than all lower numbers 
combined speaks to the likelihood of drivers being contacted multiple times. While 80% of 
drivers were asked to sign petitions in these messages, 69% thought that these messages were 
clearly communicated and not misleading, making the probability of drivers mistakenly or 
unintentionally signing such petitions rather low. While these messages were not considered 
particularly insidious, respondents did not find them to be very persuasive or agreeable either, as 
67% of drivers claimed that these messages had very little or minimal impact on their opinions 
on schedule flexibility. In an effort to gain a more detailed understanding of their initial reactions 
to these messages, the survey also included space for respondents to elaborate on their thoughts 
at length. Of these responses, 37.5% featured negative sentiments, with multiple drivers 
suspecting these messages to have self-serving, disingenuous motives, while only 5% of 
responses expressed positive reactions to the messages. The remaining 37.5% of responses were 
neutral, most of which flatly stating that the respondent knew the messages were about AB5 with 
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no additional context of the respondent’s thoughts on the matter. Below are examples of positive, 
negative and neutral answers that are representative of the group’s general tenor. 
 
 
Respondents were split on whether they felt pressure to conform with the point of view 
expressed in Uber and Lyfts’ messages, but only 22% claimed that their views on the matter 
were in any way altered by these messages. This intriguing dynamic may indicate that this 
tactic’s partisan, propagandic nature was simply too transparent to earnestly change drivers’ 
pre-existing opinions, but a common reluctance to admit susceptibility to propaganda (especially 
when it is being served by one’s employer) amongst respondents likely contributed toward this 
outcome as well. Respondents’ long average tenure with Uber and Lyft also explains the 
negative responses to these messages, as these are the very drivers who have become accustomed 
to the fallout from these companies’ recurring political and legal struggles being hoisted upon 
  
Positive Neutral Negative 
“As they said protecting the 
flexibility” 
“They want us to stay classifed 
as independent contractors” 
“I thought they were a scam and 
trying to mislead us” 
 
“I was concerned about losing 
my ability to earn” 
“About AB5 and not wanting it 
passed” 
“I was angry. Rideshare 
companies are manipulating and 
deceiving drivers to act against 
drivers best interests.” 
 
“Support them” “Preventing AB5” “They were f****** b***s*** 
a** ploys to trick drivers into 
supporting the companies which 
have repeatedly shown they dont 
f****** care.. greedy bastards.” 
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them through consistently shifting company policies, company-mandated fare decreases, and a 
general lack of workplace autonomy. A common theme amongst both the survey responses I 
received as well as the discourse in the online driver forums I observed was a generalized 
skepticism toward all company-sponsored initiatives and policy changes, largely stemming from 
the belief amongst longer-tenured drivers that such changes often result in improved conditions 
for the company, but less beneficial for drivers.  
When queried about their thoughts on the appropriateness of companies sending political 
messages to their employees in general, respondents’ opinions were split rather evenly. While 
41% find it inappropriate for companies to send their workers political messages, 33% believe it 
depends on the relevance of the political issue at hand to either the company as a whole or the 
worker’s role specifically and another 18% think such messaging is appropriate regardless of its 
relevance. The variety in response to this question indicates the nuance that emerges when such 
messaging is considered in the abstract, as opposed to respondents’ markedly negative response 
to political messaging from their employers regarding AB5 specifically. While the transmission 
of this sort of information in and of itself may be seen as favorable, the biases of the messenger, 
especially in circumstances where workers' livelihoods may be at risk, seem to be the primary 
cause for concern.  
The question that lies at the core of this debate is whether drivers prefer to be 
independent contractors or employees. In many of its official AB5-related communications, Uber 
has cited that the “vast majority” of drivers wish to remain independent contractors largely due 
to their desire to retain schedule flexibility (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 3). Despite their negative 
reaction to Uber and Lyfts’ messaging on the topic, 56% of survey respondents expressed the 
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desire to remain independent contractors, while 25% preferred employee status and the 
remaining 17% had no strong preference. This result is made all the more surprising when it’s 
considered alongside the fact that almost 33% of respondents drive over 40 hours per week, 
which is the threshold for full time status under the California Labor Code. Of those who work 
over 40 hours per week, 38% preferred employee status, a notable increase from the overall 
proportion but still lower than one might anticipate. This preference for independent contractor 
status is further illuminated by the fact that driving is the primary source of income for only 45% 
of respondents, meaning that a majority either have additional forms of employment other than 
driving or have family members who contribute significantly to their household’s total income. 
This dynamic helps explain the lack of desire for the benefits and other protections that full-time 
employment status legally requires, as those for whom driving is not the primary source of 
income are more likely to receive these benefits from other sources including.  
Ultimately, Uber’s strategy of whipping legislative opposition to AB5 through compiling 
driver support via petition was unsuccessful, as the California Senate passed the bill on 
September 11, 2019 and Governor Newsom signed the bill into law exactly one week later. 
Spanning both before and after AB5’s passage, Uber has embarked on a campaign to exempt 
itself from the bill’s provisions by employing rhetorical and legal tactics that were varied, 
expansive and often contradictory, creating an increasingly muddled and amorphous corporate 
identity intended to take whichever shape that proved most effective at staving off the harshest 
effects of this regulatory measure. 
The first tactic aimed at exempting Uber from AB5’s provisions was actually in practice 
well before AB5 was signed into law. Throughout 2018 and 2019, Uber expanded its 
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transportation offerings substantially, starting with the purchase of  e-bike and scooter rental 
company Jump in April 2018. In a post-purchase phone call with the tech industry publication 
TechCrunch ​CEO Dara Koshrowhahi explained the decision as one intended to make Uber’s 
transportation offerings more comprehensive, noting that “We see the Uber app as moving from 
just being about car sharing and car hailing to really helping the consumer get from A to B in the 
most affordable, most dependable, most convenient way. And we think e-bikes are just a 
spectacularly great product” (Dickey 2018). The company’s expansion only accelerated from 
that point, as its announcement of a feature available on the Uber app in certain cities that allows 
users to “see nearby public transit stops and real-time departure information,” on January 1, 2019 
marked the beginning of a series of increasingly ambitious expansions aimed at drastically 
reconfiguring the company (“Sometimes the fast lane is the bus lane” 2019). The “Uber Transit” 
announcement was followed up three months later (and mere weeks before Uber’s IPO) by an 
expansion of the company’s Autonomous Vehicle Group, marked by the announcement of a $1 
billion fundraising round and $7.25 billion valuation with contributions coming from the likes of 
Toyota and SoftBank (Conger 2019). The company made headlines again in July with its 
unveiling of Uber Copter, a helicopter chartering service offering weekday service between 
Manhattan and John F Kennedy International Airport that was billed as “the future of urban air 
mobility” (“Introducing Uber Copter” 2019). In perhaps the most extreme deviation from its 
original business, Uber announced its entrance into the financial services sector in October 2019 
with Uber Money - a suite of financial products including debit and credit cards for the 
company’s drivers and riders alike with the goal of “adding ​additional value for the Uber 
community, all at Uber speed” (Hazelhurst 2019). The unbridled ambition and aggressiveness 
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that the company exhibited in its pursuit of five new ventures within an eighteen month period is 
newsworthy in its own right, but elicits a deeper analysis when considered within the context of 
the company’s IPO and its efforts to avoid the regulation of its labor practices by AB5.  
Uber’s rapid and multi-directional expansion in the months surrounding its IPO was 
interpreted by many observers in the finance sector and financial press as an attempt at bolstering 
and justifying the company’s valuation while quelling potential investors’ fears regarding the 
company’s history of staggering financial losses (Trainer 2019; Conger 2019). While the 
company’s ride-hailing service had only ever operated at immense losses - reaching $3 billion in 
2018 - its expansion into areas as diverse as e-bikes, helicopters and financial services was seen 
as an attempt at enhancing its prospects for future profitability and growing its overall market 
cap. It seemed as though ride-hailing had taken Uber as far as it could, and the only options for 
continued growth were in other businesses. The financial justification for this puzzling 
expansion, however, does not address the regulatory and rhetorical goals it seemingly also 
intended to accomplish. For a company to fulfill part “B” of  AB5’s “ABC” test for employment, 
it must prove that its independent contract workers “​perform work that is outside the usual 
course of the hiring entity’s business,” a condition that would seem to be difficult for Uber to 
prove in regards to its drivers. In the company’s IPO prospectus, an official document disclosing 
all information deemed relevant to potential investors and filed with the SEC, Uber’s ride-hailing 
and food delivery services are distinguished as its “core platform,” with ride-hailing alone 
accounting for roughly 82% of the company’s revenue in 2018 (S-1 2019, 2; S-1 2019, 18-22). 
Such a distinction would seem to position the company’s drivers (of both the food delivery and 
ride hailing varieties), who perform labor that constitutes the “core” of the company’s business, 
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as employees under the “ABC” test’s qualifications. By involving itself in a litany of new 
industries in the months immediately preceding AB5’s passage, Uber was attempting to build its 
case against the regulatory statute applying to its drivers. Though it is highly unlikely that any of 
the company’s recently launched ventures will overtake ride hailing as its primary revenue 
stream, the mere fact that the Uber app has grown to encompass a considerably wider menu of 
services outside the realm of ride hailing bolsters the company’s long-standing anti-regulatory 
argument that its product is a technological platform that connects producers and consumers of 
various services. Essentially, ride hailing becomes less of Uber’s “usual course of business” as 
additional service options are added to its platform, obscuring the true nature of its business. 
Rather than solely relying on this argument as its defense against AB5’s "ABC" test applying to 
its drivers, however, Uber began rolling out a number of changes to its systems of driver 
administration in California with the intent of satisfying the “ABC” test’s conditions in the 
months immediately following AB5’s passage. 
In a December 2019 blog post directed toward its California-based drivers titled 
“Keeping you in the Drivers’ Seat,” Uber announced a number of new features for drivers it 
would be rolling out in the ensuing months. Such features and tweaks included “displaying trip 
time, expected earning range and destination upfront (before a driver accepts the ride),” the 
ability to “build your business” by allowing riders to “request their favorite drivers when 
scheduling a trip in advance” and assurance that ride acceptance rates would no longer impact 
drivers’ “Uber Pro” status and access to “Uber Pro Rewards” (“To California Drivers: Keeping 
you in the driver's seat,” 2019). Prior to these changes, Uber’s control over their drivers’ 
workflows was considerably more noticeable, as drivers were essentially forced to accept rides 
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while knowing virtually nothing about their destination, the estimated duration of the ride or the 
fare they would receive. To be sure, drivers had the option to cancel rides after initially accepting 
them, but doing so would lead to a decline in their “driver rating,” which is what some drivers 
and researchers believe partially determines the quantity and quality of ride offers that a driver 
receives (Rosenblat 2018, 95). Under the amended system announced in the “Keeping you in the 
Driver’s Seat” blog post, drivers have access to detailed previews of what their prospective ride 
will entail in terms of duration, fare, route and ultimate destination, ostensibly giving them more 
autonomy over their workflow and and the semblance of independence.  
 Uber followed this up with a second set of updates unveiled roughly one month later in 
another blog post. This time, the company announced that its fare structures would be 
streamlined and made more transparent, largely through the implementation of a uniform cap on 
“service fees'' for UberX rides and expansion of the “upfront pricing” model to UberPOOL rides 
(“To California Drivers: Keeping you in the driver’s seat, part 2” 2020).  The changes announced 
in these two blog posts point to an attempt by uber Uber to exempt itself from part “A” of the 
AB5 “ABC test,” which states that a worker is an independent contractor if “the person is free 
from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the 
work.” To be sure, many of these changes seem genuinely beneficial for drivers, as they 
ostensibly provide increased levels of workflow autonomy and independence.  In an FAQ section 
at the bottom of this blog post, however, it is disclosed that these changes were being 
implemented due to “changing laws in California '' and that they would apply only to drivers 
operating in the state (“To California Drivers: Keeping you in the driver's seat” 2019). This 
addendum makes Uber’s intentions seem considerably less altruistic than one might initially 
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believe, pointing to legal necessity as their driving force rather than an earnest, altruistic effort to 
empower and assist drivers. 
This argument was further strengthened in late January 2020 when Uber unveiled its plan 
to allow drivers to set their own fares for rides originating at certain small-scale airports 
throughout the state, perhaps the most extreme concession of the entire suite of changes (Brown 
2020). It is important to note, however, that driver autonomy is still limited in this new structure, 
as drivers will only be able to set fares up to five times higher than the company’s base fare 
(Brown 2020). By decreasing the punishments for rejecting rides, providing trip information 
before drivers are to accept rides, and allowing drivers to set their own fares in certain 
circumstances, Uber is seemingly providing its California drivers with opportunities to create 
more stable, controllable work structures that would lend themselves to AB5’s definition of 
independent contract work. This response by Uber harkens back to Veena Dubal’s findings from 
her case studies of successful class action misclassification suits mounted by taxi and delivery 
drivers. In one of the cases Dubal’s research focuses on, FedEx responds to a court finding its 
delivery drivers to be employees by “using the court’s decision as a road map” and “drawing on 
their legal and business acumen to alter their business model so that workers looked even less 
like employees under the established case law” (Dubal 2017, 747).  To be sure, in neither Uber 
or FedEx’s case do these changes fundamentally alter the companies’ business models, as drivers 
must still complete rides supplied to them by the company if they wish to earn money and lack 
the bargaining power through which they could negotiate wages or fare splits between 
themselves and the company.  
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While various aspects of the blog posts in which Uber announced these changes point to 
the potentially duplicitous nature of their origins, their calculated and transactional nature comes 
into sharp relief when considered in tandem with another primary aspect of its anti-AB5 strategy: 
outright denial of the law’s applicability to the company. Nowhere was this perspective more 
clearly elucidated than in the press phone call organized by Uber chief counsel Tony West that 
took place on the day of the law’s passage through the California Senate. After spending the first 
portion of the call clearing up a number of the journalists’ misconceptions about AB5 and its 
impact on Uber - namely that the law does not automatically reclassify drivers but rather subjects 
companies who use independent contract labor to a more stringent test to prove correct 
classification - West resorts to one of Uber’s foundational rhetorical tactics: pitting regulators 
against drivers. Specifically, West mentions that while AB5’s applicability to Uber’s drivers in 
California remains in question, “because we continue to believe that drivers are properly 
classified as independent, and because we’ll continue to be responsive to what the vast majority 
of drivers tell us they want most - flexibility - drivers will not automatically be reclassified as 
employees even after January of next year” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 3). This quote puts the 
supposed collective will of the company’s drivers in direct contention with regulators’ duty to 
determine the applicability of relevant laws to the individuals and organizations in question. In 
using this rhetorical tactic, West shifts focus away from Uber the corporation and depicts the 
impasse as one between its struggling working class drivers and a punitive, out of touch state 
government. This instance is another example of a high-level representative of Uber fashioning 
the company’s identity as an engine of economic populism fighting for the rights and perceived 
interests of its workers against an ossified, unresponsive government bureaucracy. The ultimate 
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impact of such a tactic remains to be seen. However, markedly similar tactics have animated a 
significant part of Uber’s post-AB5 repertoire, and their extended application will be discussed 
in further detail later in this research.  
Perhaps the most striking part about this remark, however, is the fact that it is largely 
invalidated by the operational changes that the company would roll out over the ensuing months 
with the express intent of helping it conform to the new regulatory landscape. If the company’s 
executives and attorneys truly did not believe that AB5’s "ABC" test would apply to their 
drivers, it is highly unlikely that they would go through the trouble of altering the company’s 
systems of driver administration in one of its most lucrative markets, nor would they willfully 
cede control over fare levels and driver acceptance rates. Uber’s rhetoric in terms of its relations 
with drivers is rife with vague allusions to empowerment through innovation - a time honored 
Silicon Valley trope - but its lengthy history of doing wrong by its drivers in terms of their 
wages, safety and workplace autonomy leaves little reason to put stock in the company's 
performative altruism. Towards the end of the call, West alludes to the company’s intention to 
“adapt” to the new regulatory environment when he claims “One thing I do know is that this 
business is incredibly adaptable and has withstood enormous, enormous challenges to both its 
business model as well as other things, and it has always come through those stronger and more 
responsive” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 12). This statement, aside from resembling an admission of 
the company’s non-compliance under its pre-AB5 business model, reifies the antagonistic, 
adversarial relationship between Uber and its regulators that has its origins in “Travis’ Law” and 
the company’s growth strategy as a whole. Further, West’s use of the word “adapt” is instructive 
of the company’s ongoing attempt at stylizing its business model and corporate identity as 
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virtuous rather than simply illegal, as “adaptation” typically holds a positive connotation that 
would seem to belie the treacherous circumstances facing the company at that time. In using this 
phrasing, West is also attributing human characteristics to Uber as a corporation when in truth 
the company’s misguided and often illegal practices are not perpetuated by some amorphous, 
opaque legal construct but rather by a small cohort of executives and board members who 
understand the potential implications of these actions well before actual repercussions like AB5 
come to bear. This rhetoric acts as a smokescreen intended to deflect culpability away from any 
individual Uber executive, representative, or any being theoretically sensible enough to know 
that breaking the law might court trouble. Rather, West is attempting to redirect any popular 
animosity or anguish toward the outdated and unfair “system” that consistently burdens Uber 
with regulations that force it to be “adaptable” in the first place. Ultimately, this statement is an 
admission that Uber emphasizes different interpretations of its corporate identity depending on 
the circumstances at hand, namely to satiate the fears and concerns of regulators, riders and 
investors as regulatory standards continually shift.  
 
c. The “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act” and the Focus on Flexibility 
In the very same post-AB5 press call in which he downplayed Uber’s susceptibility to 
AB5’s provisions, Tony West championed the company’s counter-proposal as a progressive 
alternative to the overly-punitive AB5. Virtually all of this counter-offer’s provisions including a 
wage floor, employer healthcare contribution, insurance for on-the-job injuries and enhanced 
driver safety protocols were formalized and compiled into a piece of legislation called the 
“Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act” (Protect App Based Drivers and Services, n.d.). 
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This bill, which has been primarily funded and championed by some of the very companies it 
will most directly benefit including Uber, Lyft and GrubHub, ultimately aims to exempt TNCs 
from AB5’s "ABC" test by formally re-establishing their drivers as independent contractors 
(Protect App Based Drivers and Services, n.d).  
Aside from the bill’s actual provisions, the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” 
website also prominently features claims that the bill will “protect access to affordable and 
convenient rideshare and delivery services” (Protect App Based Drivers and Services, n.d). With 
this seemingly intentionally vague claim, the bill’s proponents are again attempting to weaponize 
customer satisfaction and reliance on the status quo by insinuating that maintaining the level of 
service these companies’ customers have become accustomed to would be untenable if AB5’s 
“ABC” test reclassifies TNC drivers as employees. This argument was repeated nearly verbatim 
in California-based media outlets like ​The Sacramento Bee, ​which ran an opinion column in 
August 2019 that warned that AB5 “decreases the number of potential drivers available to meet 
demand at any given time, thereby increasing consumer costs and wait times for passengers” 
(Leroe-Munoz 2019). In truth, however, it is unclear what the impact on service level would be if 
TNCs were to fail AB5’s “ABC test,” although the fact that prior research has found that the 
company’s full-time drivers provide most of its service seems to at least partially disprove these 
allegations (Zatz 2016). Nonetheless, the intent of such a statement is clear, as it aims to grossly 
oversimplify what is truly a multi-faceted issue into one that hinges on consumer satisfaction and 
convenience alone. While the Act’s provisions, which essentially amount to scaled-down 
versions of many of the benefits normally afforded by employee status, represent little more than 
a compromise position between full employment and independent contractor status, the 
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messaging of the wider media campaign in support of the Act reveals far more about Uber’s 
desired corporate identity and positionality relative to both the public and its regulators.  
As of this research, there has shockingly been little public attention paid to the “Protect 
App Based Drivers and Services Act” despite the facts that the Act has officially qualified for the 
November 2020 California ballot and that the wider dispute over worker classification remains 
hotly contested. Thus, the Act’s official website becomes the de facto primary avenue through 
which one can analyze the messaging and rhetoric of the “Protect App Based Drivers and 
Services” campaign. At first glance, very little about this website stands out from the typical 
political campaign site - slick graphics that communicate the candidate or bill’s agenda in broad 
strokes, glowing testimonials from a diverse coalition of community members and experts, a list 
of endorsements from national and local organizations. When viewed within the context of the 
act’s actual provisions, however, intriguing trends come to the fore. While the site includes brief 
descriptions of each provision, the majority of the site’s messaging revolves around the concept 
of “protecting driver flexibility.” The overemphasis on this concept in the website’s messaging is 
most noticeable on the “driver stories” page, which contains 71 testimonials from drivers 
working throughout California.  
In efforts to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the campaign’s messaging, I 
conducted an analysis of these testimonials - which are presented in both video and text-based 
formats - to identify the themes, experiences and beliefs that animate these drivers’ preference to 
remain independent contractors. Before this analysis can be discussed, however, it must be noted 
that the site automatically cycles through a much larger set of testimonials, showing a selection 
of 71 at any given time. Thus, my analysis, which was conducted on a single set of 71 
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testimonials, may not be completely reflective of the unknown total amount of testimonials in the 
campaign’s database. In these testimonials, the word “flexibility” was included a total of 104 
times, while words that would imply drivers’ mentioning of other aspects of the Act (like a wage 
floor or injury protection) were mentioned no more than three times each. While all but one 
testimonial - submitted by a man named Jody C from Palmdale - carried the implicit theme of 
desiring or needing schedule flexibility, 65% of drivers ​explicitly​ used the word “flexibility” in 
their testimonials. Within this majority cohort, two primary subsets emerged. The largest 
plurality of drivers, accounting for 48% of the total, cited familial responsibilities as the primary 
reasoning for prioritizing flexibility over other concerns, while the remaining 17% cited needing 
flexibility in order to pursue a specific career or academic goal. The sentiment that drivers value 
flexibility above all other considerations has gained credence among pockets of the news media 
as well, namely local outlets throughout California. A October 2019 opinion column in the Daily 
News of Los Angeles titled “The high cost of ending independent labor,” which claims that 
“lawmakers are out of touch, and drivers value the flexibility driving for Uber offers, which 
allows them to meet family obligations,” echoes this sentiment almost verbatim (Kovacs 2019). 
A complete list of these testimonials’ emergent themes can be found in Appendix B.  
In efforts to gauge the extent to which the testimonials included on the “Protect App 
Based Drivers and Services” website are skewed to over-represent drivers’ desire for 
“flexibility,” I conducted an identical analysis of Uber’s own “driver stories” video series, which 
can be found on the company’s YouTube page. This series, which consists of 62 videos that have 
accumulated over 9.3 million views since the first video was published in September 2014, 
serves as a control group for the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials because 
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it spans multiple campaigns, issue areas and locations, thus providing a less case-specific 
depiction of Uber’s desired corporate identity. Of the 62 Uber-specific “driver stories,” 42% 
featured flexibility as a primary theme expressed either implicitly or explicitly. Of this 42%, 
there were an equal number of videos featuring drivers citing family-based needs and 
career/academic goals as their justification for prioritizing flexibility. Equally instructive of this 
divergence is the fact that almost one third of the references to flexibility on Uber’s YouTube 
page come from a single series published in November 2019. This series, titled “Stay Flexible,” 
featured eight drivers from New York State explaining why Uber’s schedule flexibility is 
important to their lives in a largely similar manner to the “Protect App Based Drivers and 
Services” testimonials. Although the “Stay Flexible” videos do not mention this explicitly, they 
were published one month after New York State Senator Diane Sevino announced her plan to 
introduce legislation that would codify an "ABC" test similar to AB5’s into law (Opfer and 
Clukey 2019). The thematic similarities between the “Stay Flexible” and “Protect App Based 
Drivers and Services” campaigns reinforces the notion that, when faced with a legislative 
challenge to its labor practices, Uber’s marketing and policy teams view “flexibility” as the most 
powerful frame through which to express the company’s identity and state its case against driver 
reclassification. 
The hyper-focus on “flexibility” as the fulcrum on which the entire debate over driver 
classification hinges risks dangerously oversimplifying what is in fact a multifaceted piece of 
legislation that attempts to solve a complex problem. By solely displaying testimonials that 
depict drivers’ desire for “flexibility” and making it the focal point of the website’s entire 
messaging, Uber ​is obscuring the other provisions of the “Protect App Based Drivers and Service 
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Act,” which is seemingly an attempt to misinform drivers and voters across the state alike. This 
tactic functions in tandem with the almost complete lack of direct references to AB5 on the 
website, as they both aim to curate knowledge on the topic in a manner that maximizes the 
appeal of Uber and its allies’ position. 
To further understand the reasoning behind this point of view, it is important to consider 
the interplay taking place between the company’s appeals to “flexibility” and the dire economic 
conditions of California’s working class. As wage levels remain largely stagnant and the social 
safety net becomes increasingly threadbare, rising income inequality and overall cost of living 
across the state expose working class Californians to immense levels of economic precarity. 
Though these issues exist and are perpetuated at a scale that transcends the ongoing debate over 
the classification of TNC drivers, their relevance to the daily lives of tens of millions of 
Californians enhances the political efficacy of calls to “protect driver flexibility.” In many of the 
“Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials, drivers describe their need for 
“flexibility” as a byproduct of the precarity that is in danger of enveloping their lives. This 
precarity can take countless different forms from material manifestations like job loss, 
insufficient wages from a full time job and insufficient fixed-level retirement or disability 
income to the psychological damage that chronic financial instability and uncertainty has been 
known to perpetuate. In sum, 31 out of the 71 testimonials touched on themes of precarity, with 
retirees supplementing fixed sources of income and workers supplementing the insufficient 
wages from their non-driving full time job making up the majority of this sub-group. 
While access to flexibly-scheduled work like driving for Uber is undoubtedly a viable 
way for one experiencing economic precarity to supplement their income and gain stability, the 
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role that “flexibility” plays in the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials 
suggests that the company plays a far more fundamental role for in promoting economic justice 
than a closer analysis would reveal. Essentially, these testimonials position ​Uber as a neutral 
actor that provides people with a tool to try to overcome their precarious circumstances or 
provide a safety net for emergency circumstances. This alters the associative relationship that 
drivers and the public at large may have with Uber by obfuscating the true power and 
decision-making ability that the company itself retains over drivers’ livelihoods. Namely, this 
depiction obscures Uber’s own role in perpetuating or exacerbating this precarity by reserving 
the right to unilaterally control virtually all aspects of drivers’ workflow from fare splits to trip 
assignment. In its depiction of Uber as an entity that can provide increased levels of economic 
security in ways that employers and governmental institutions are either no longer required or 
able to provide, this messaging framework also serves to reinforce Uber’s self-perpetuated 
corporate identity as a champion of economic empowerment and opportunity. In truth, however, 
the “flexibility” that both the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act”  as well as Uber’s 
general corporate messaging champions is a misleadingly broad framework for a concept that 
only significantly impacts the flexibility of drivers’ schedules. Throughout the “Protect App 
Based Drivers and Services” website and testimonials, “flexibility” offered essentially as a 
standalone concept, inviting the viewer to insinuate that the Act will introduce flexibility in all 
aspects of drivers’ work. This is simply untrue, as the Act’s provisions feature a thin definition of 
flexibility and do nothing to increase drivers’ agency over where they work, who they pick up or 
what times of day are most lucrative to work. While some of Uber’s post-AB5 capitulations to 
drivers in hopes of passing AB5’s “ABC” test do marginally increase driver agency by 
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diminishing the penalties for rejecting rides, such policy changes do not decouple drivers’ 
earning capabilities from the control of Uber’s dispatch algorithm in a way that amounts to 
full-fledged flexibility.  That this argument is being made through driver testimonials and 
companies claims of “what drivers tell us they want” only serves to reinforce its pseudo-populist 
appeal and aggrandize its claims. 
While flexibility-based appeals do in fact constitute the plurality of “driver stories” 
videos on Uber’s YouTube page, other notable themes are apparent in this series as well. 
Namely, this series includes videos extolling the social benefits of driving, connecting driving to 
identity-based narratives of empowerment, and positioning driving as a way for people to earn 
“extra” money. On the contrary, the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials exist 
almost exclusively within the common thematic framework of flexibility. This is not to say, 
however, that there is no thematic overlap between the YouTube “driver stories” and the “Protect 
App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials. In fact, a sizable portion of the “Protect App 
Based Drivers and Services” testimonials contain sub-themes that dovetail with those expressed 
in the YouTube “driver stories.” However, the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” 
testimonials tend to depict these themes in more dire, less glamorous terms than the more 
optimistic contents published on Uber’s YouTube page. This thematic divergence is indicative of 
the messaging and issue framing that Uber and its co-sponsors sees as most politically salient 
and persuasive in the context of a ballot initiative campaign.  
A prime example of this thematic divergence and its impetus in the differing goals of the 
respective campaigns is the manner in which each set of “driver stories” depicts drivers’ 
relationship to the money they earn driving. The YouTube “driver stories” typically cite drivers 
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working to earn “extra money,” often within the context of a non-essential economic pursuit like 
saving up for a vacation or funding a hobby. Such narratives are included in 42% of the 
YouTube “driver stories,” while only 5% explicitly mention income from driving fulfilling an 
economic need. Within the considerably more contentious context of a political campaign, 
however, this trend reverses. The “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials feature 
narratives of economic need and “extra money” almost equally, with economic need emerging in 
25% of testimonials and “extra money” featuring in 20%. Further, allusions to drivers’ struggles 
with keeping up with rising costs of living can be found in 8.4% of the “Protect App Based 
Drivers and Services” testimonials and only 1.6% of the YouTube “driver stories,” a dynamic 
that lends itself to California’s status as a uniquely expensive place to live as well as the 
respective campaigns’ disparate goals. While the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” 
testimonials seem to be honing in on narratives of dire economic need compounded by myriad 
structural obstacles under the assumption that such narratives will invite a wide base of political 
support, the YouTube “driver stories” depict a considerably wider range of benefits associated 
with driving, oftentimes eschewing an economic lens altogether.  
Chief among the non-economic themes included in Uber’s “driver stories” YouTube 
series is the company’s supposed role in empowering those who face marginalization and 
discrimination based upon their race, gender identity, sexual orientation, level of physical ability 
or age. In total, 31% of all YouTube “driver stories” focused on such a theme, often making only 
vague connections between personal empowerment and driving for Uber specifically. Often, the 
videos seemed to conflate the ability to earn money driving for Uber with much broader themes 
of identity-based empowerment. Two videos in particular exemplify this misleading messaging, 
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the first of which profiles a female driver from Brazil named Glaucia. After expressing pride in 
her status as “the first female Uber driver to achieve a 5 star rating in Brazil,” Glaucia states “​for 
me, driving means freedom, independence, and I think it’s very important that women fight for 
empowerment” (“Glaucia, São Paulo, Brazil” 2019). This quote represents an attempt by Uber to 
directly link the ability to work for their company with the wider societal project of pursuing 
gender equality without providing evidence of what exactly driving for Uber does to improve the 
situations of women outside providing them with opportunities to earn income. Perhaps the most 
egregious example of this conflation, however, is a video featuring a Saudi Arabian woman 
named Badriyah. In this video, Uber makes a stunningly obtuse attempt at equating Saudi 
women’s newly won right to drive with their ability to use this newfound right to drive for Uber. 
This dynamic becomes readily apparent when Badriyah notes that “I feel happy transferring my 
knowledge [of driving] and passing it down to other women who will then pass it on. It is the 
pinnacle of happiness” (“Badriyah, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia” 2019). The freedom of movement 
afforded by the legal right to drive is an unquestionably important development with myriad 
implications in the lives of millions of Saudi women, and Uber’s attempt at insinuating the 
ability to drive for Uber is in any way comparable in terms of the freedom it affords is not only 
self-serving, but shockingly cynical as well.  
Though gender-based narratives constituted roughly half of all YouTube “driver stories” 
focused on empowerment, narratives of age and physical ability-based empowerment figured 
prominently within this theme as well. The “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” website 
features a similar number of empowerment-based narratives, with roughly one quarter of the 
featured testimonials including this theme. However, all 19 testimonials that fit within this theme 
  
95 
feature drivers who face obstacles stemming from their age or level of physical ability, with no 
references to race, gender or sexuality-based difficulties in the job market. Within this group of 
testimonials, stories of retirees unable to remain financially stable on a fixed income and those 
who have limited job options due to a physical disability figure most prominently. Again, the 
stark contrast between the narratives pushed and corporate identity assumed by Uber in the 
context of a political campaign and those it adopts in general promotional efforts is notable. 
Perhaps as a preemptive measure to avoid losing any measure of political support due to feelings 
of latent sexism, racism, homophobia or transphobia amongst voters, it seems as though Uber is 
focusing on narratives that empower those impacted by circumstances that transcend the 
boundaries of race, gender and sexual identity - namely aging and physical disability. This 
strategy, however, is more than an electoral safeguard against the potential bigotry of the voting 
public. It is proof that Uber’s corporate identity will center the stories and champion the 
empowerment of marginalized communities only when it is deemed economically or politically 
beneficial for the company to do so. Thus, Uber’s public-facing identity is inherently amorphous 
and intrinsically tied to economic concerns, undermining any expressed commitments to social 
justice or equity that its advertisements and driver testimonials may express.  
 
d. Uber’s Co-optation of Consumerist Rhetoric in Driver Communications 
Though Uber clearly considers flexibility-based arguments to be the most politically 
salient for preventing labor regulations, its marketing and policy teams routinely employ other 
rhetorical strategies that significantly muddle the company’s message by describing drivers’ 
work with consumerist rhetoric. This thoroughly confounding trend is readily apparent in the 
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company’s IPO prospectus, in which drivers are referred to in a number of seemingly conflicting 
ways. In the prospectus’ glossary, drivers are clearly defined as “an independent driver or courier 
who uses our platform to provide Ridesharing services, UberEats services, or both” (S-1 2019, 
ii). However, just a few lines below this definition, drivers are also included in the definition of 
the company’s “partners,” which supposedly include “any one of a Driver, restaurant, or shipper, 
all of whom are our customers” (S-1 2019, ii). The final clause of the company-provided 
definition of its “partners” introduces added uncertainty, as it essentially classifies all drivers, 
restaurants and shippers that it does business with as both “partners” and “customers” without 
providing any explanation or justification as to why both classifications include the exact same 
groups of actors and what functional differences, if any, exist between these two classifications. 
This delineation is further blurred by the fact that those who solicit rides or order food on the app 
are referred to as its “consumers or end-users.” Though there technically is a difference between 
“customers” and “consumers,” the two terms are used in largely similar manners in all but the 
most formal circumstances, thus further complicating the perceived nature of both drivers and 
riders’ relationship with the company. Finally, drivers also find themselves included in the 
company’s definition of its “massive network,” which includes “t​ens of millions of Drivers, 
consumers, restaurants, shippers, carriers, and dockless e-bikes and e-scooters, as well as 
underlying data, technology, and shared infrastructure” (S-1 2019, 1). This grouping, which 
equates the human actors who interact with the company to pieces of equipment owned by the 
company, perhaps reveals the most about the true nature of Uber’s relationship with its drivers.  
From a purely economic perspective, the company perceives its drivers as performing the 
exact same function - transporting riders to their destination in the most convenient, rapid way 
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possible - as the e-bikes, scooters and algorithmic technologies that the company owns. This 
amoral perspective has deep roots in the company’s ethos, and can be traced back to co-founder 
Travis Kalanick’s reported penchant for referring to the company’s drivers as its “supply,” a 
term that even more directly equates the company’s workforce to its capital goods (Isaac 2019, 
111). The use of this nomenclature reinforces perspectives and strategies that serve to 
dehumanize drivers by considering their needs and desires in the same manner that one would 
approach maintaining a piece of equipment - that is to say, providing them with the absolute 
minimum level of resources and support needed for the continued performance of their assigned 
task. This perspective has seemingly informed the general arc of Uber’s relationship with 
drivers, only affording them additional workplace rights and autonomy when they are legally 
obligated to do so or facing a public relations crisis deemed severe enough to elicit concessions. 
The examples of such circumstances are myriad, and include instances discussed earlier in this 
research, namely the company’s continued rollout of changes to fare structure and dispatch 
systems in efforts to decrease the likelihood of AB5’s "ABC" test applying to its drivers. Though 
this relational dynamic has long guided Uber’s internal calculus of its management of drivers, 
recent driver-directed communications feature language and administrative programs that 
seemingly serve to normalize these dynamics in the minds of drivers themselves. 
The language that Uber has begun to adopt in recent blog posts aimed at its 
California-based drivers display similar rhetorical intent to the terminology used in the 
company’s IPO prospectus and other non-public facing communications. A relatively early 
example of this is a blog post from July 2019 titled “Uber Pro: Summer of Rewards.” This post 
outlines a program by which, for a limited time, drivers can access a number of perks like 
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increased cash back on gasoline purchases, discounted rates on short term car rentals through 
Fair, the company’s rental subsidiary, and the opportunity for drivers who’ve attained “Pro 
Platinum Status or higher” to enter in a sweepstakes for a $5,000 United Airlines gift card, with 
the number of entries per driver dictated by the number of rides they provide in a given time 
frame (“Uber Pro: Summer of Rewards” 2019). Typically, rewards programs like the one 
outlined in the “Summer of Rewards” blog post are marketed toward customers of a product or 
service with the intention of incentivizing consistent patronage. This structure becomes 
problematic, however, when applied to systems of independently contracted labor, as it creates 
circumstances in which workers are incentivized to work consistently and in a specific fashion in 
hopes of receiving “rewards,” while companies remain exempt from providing the 
employment-related benefits that such consistent, structured work typically requires. 
Such a tactic was also employed in the company’s “Keeping you in the driver’s seat, part 
2” post from January 2020, wherein the company discussed a number of changes planned for its 
“driver promotions.”  The post noted that the company would be replacing a popular 
“promotion” that rewarded drivers with extra money for completing a requisite number of 
consecutive trips with a new “promotion” called “boost,” in which drivers can lower the 
company’s “service fee” by “completing trips in certain locations during busy times of day” (“To 
California Drivers: Keeping you in the driver’s seat, part 2” 2020). While the change was 
marketed as beneficial to drivers’ earning potential and independence, the “boost promotion” 
seemingly decreases drivers’ agency by explicitly coupling increased earning potential with 
specific working hours. In doing so, Uber is establishing an incentive structure that acts as a sort 
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of shadow schedule for drivers who most heavily rely on income earned from driving and 
actively seek out ways to maximize their earnings.  
Regardless of this policy change’s functional impact on drivers, which is likely to be 
highly subjective, the usage of the term “promotion” in and of itself deserves additional scrutiny 
in regards to its rhetorical effect. The usage of language like “promotion” that implies suggestion 
rather than direction affords Uber the plausible deniability that drivers are not forced to adhere to 
these constraints, even though they’re incentivized to. Similarly, this rhetorical framework 
furthers the argument that drivers are consumers of Uber’s technology rather than the company’s 
employees or even workers at all, thus theoretically affording them more autonomy over their 
work outcomes than they truly have. Conversely, the threshold for what Uber is expected to 
provide its drivers is lowered by this rhetoric, as positioning drivers as consumers rather than 
workers or employees decouples drivers’ well-being from the company’s policies and actions. 
This rhetoric works in concert with Uber’s self-appointed identity as a technology company 
rather than a taxi company, wherein the company portrays its relationship with its drivers as 
simply providing them a digital platform on which to build their own businesses. By focusing 
this messaging in driver-directed blog posts, Uber is seemingly attempting to encourage drivers 
to adopt a similar understanding of their relationship to the company, perhaps to temper their 
expectations of what level of support they should expect from the company. Due to the fact that 
these “promotions” and “rewards programs” are optional for drivers to participate in, Uber 
maintains plausible deniability against allegations that it is coercing or forcefully dictating driver 
behavior in any meaningful way, regardless of the fact that the financial incentives included in 





Though their ultimate efficacy remains unclear, the corporate identity-curating rhetorical, 
legal and marketing strategies outlined and discussed above are liable to transcend the specific 
case of Uber and its fellow TNCs in California. As the algorithmic technologies that govern 
app-based work become increasingly sophisticated, they are being applied to an increasingly 
wide array of industries’ systems of labor administration, thus impacting the lives of an ever 
larger portion of the workforce. In a sense, the digital underpinnings of such labor systems act as 
a sort of smokescreen that obscures the clear lines that traditionally exist between workplace 
autonomy and organizational control, between consumer and worker. Further, these 
decentralized, app-based systems may contribute to and exacerbate the ongoing outsourcing of 
white collar and administrative work from high-wage nations like the United States and Canada 
into locales largely in the Global South with lower wage levels and less robust labor protections. 
The political, social and economic implications of labor outsourcing in a heavily globalized 
economic system are immense and deserve more scrutiny then can be afforded in this research 
alone.  
The benefits of administering a workforce of independently-contracted laborers through a 
digital interface from a corporate financial standpoint also play into the significance of this 
research. To be sure, the cost savings involved with eschewing traditional employment 
agreements for independent contract labor have been clear to corporations for decades, and it 
should be expected that the allure of such savings will continue to encourage more corporations 
to adopt this labor structure. While this practice is lucrative for the corporations that wish to 
enlist it, reliance on independent contract labor can lead to significant declines in tax revenue for 
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all levels of government. California alone loses roughly $7 billion in payroll tax revenue 
annually due to worker misclassification (Bhuiyan et al, 2019). This figure does not account for 
the additional costs the State incurs due to its provision of ​food stamps, medical care and other 
safety net benefits for independent contractors that do not have these needs adequately covered 
through their TNC work (Bhuiyan et al, 2019).​ This unilaterally-decided passing along of 
responsibility from corporation to government is inexcusable and staggeringly immoral, as it 
essentially holds the State’s taxpayers accountable for Uber’s illegal business practices and the 
resulting neglect of its workers. 
What’s more, it seems as though Uber’s terms of engagement regarding the issue of 
driver classification, informed by its messaging and framing around the “Protect App Based 
Drivers and Services Act,” are already being adopted by news media outlets throughout 
California. While California’s largest news outlets like ​the San Francisco Chronicle ​and​ the Los 
Angeles Times ​have maintained largely objective coverage of the issue, dozens of local daily and 
weekly newspapers throughout the state have adopted a rather oppositional stance to the law and 
have communicated this opposition using rhetoric and framing strikingly similar to that of Uber 
and its fellow TNCs. The three examples of such pieces from the ​Daily News of Los Angeles, the 
Sacramento Bee ​and ​the Torrance Daily Breeze​ included in the findings section of this capstone 
represent only a small fraction of the overall output I came across throughout my research 
process.  
More notable than the mere existence of such articles, however, are the patterns that 
emerge among the outlets that most often publish such content. Virtually all of the anti-AB5 and 
pro-TNC pieces I came across, and two of the three noted in this research, were published by 
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outlets owned by the same media conglomerate, Digital First Media, which owns 39 daily and 
weekly outlets throughout California and 98 outlets nationwide (Digital First Media, n.d.). The 
fact that many of the outlets the conglomerate owns heavily rely on independent contractors and 
freelance writers and would see costs rise if their workers were deemed employees by AB5’s 
“ABC” test at least partially explains the coordinated nature of this opposition (“Editorial - Don’t 
let AB5 take away your Newspaper”). The considerable reach of Digital First Media’s 
properties, which blanket the state from Eureka to Orange County, coupled with the 
conglomerate’s vested interest in returning to a pre-AB5 regulatory structure, makes it very 
likely that we will continue to see waves of anti-AB5 stories from Digital First-owned outlets as 
the battle over worker classification continues. To communicate this opposition with subtlety, 
Digital First Media solicits opinion pieces written by policy analysts at right wing and libertarian 
think tanks and syndicates them throughout its subsidiary properties, which was the case for the 
Daily Breeze ​and ​Daily News of Los Angeles​ pieces cited earlier in this research (National 
Taxpayers Union Foundation, n.d.; Competitive Enterprise Institute, n.d.). This tactic has two 
primary goals: to communicate the conglomorate’s desired message to as wide a swath of 
California’s population as possible and launder the piece’s bias due to the common perception 
amongst media consumers that local outlets are less biased than their national counterparts 
(Brenan 2019). Ultimately, the expansive yet subtle nature Digital First Media’s efforts coupled 
with those of Uber and its fellow TNCs in mounting the “Protect App Based Drivers and 
Services” campaign makes for a media environment rife with the same misconceptions and 




If Uber’s strategies for preventing the reclassification of its independently contracted 
drivers ultimately prove successful, they may serve as a blueprint for future anti-regulatory 
campaigns waged by companies that rely on independently contracted labor. While there are 
many unique elements in Uber’s case, namely its immense financial resources and its role as a 
primary form of transportation in many urban centers nationwide, the corporate identity-curating 
marketing and advertising strategies it has utilized hinge on rhetorical appeals with wide 
applicability. The appeals to flexibility and freedom that dominate the “Protect App Based 
Drivers and Services” website testimonials, the usage of consumerist rhetoric in 
workforce-facing and workforce-referencing communications as well as the conflation of 
efficiency-seeking tactics with progressive ideology are all aspects of Uber’s strategy that are 
applicable across industry lines. This research’s attempts to accentuate the inconsistencies, 
disconnect from material reality and overall duplicity of Uber’s strategy is intended to equip the 
public and regulators alike with the tools necessary to engage with such strategies in ways that 
are adequately critical and commensurate with the complex, nuanced nature of worker 
classification. Acceptance of Uber’s terms of engagement - be it tacit or explicit - serves to 
grossly oversimplify issues that impact the well-being of hundreds of thousands of working and 
middle class individuals for the sole benefit of a massively wealthy corporation masquerading as 
an engine of popular economic self-sufficiency and democratization. 
This research is intended to compliment the important work of numerous legal scholars, 
journalists, social scientists and labor activists the world over who’ve focused their research on 
the legal and technological means by which Uber has attempted to prevent the regulation of its 
labor practices. In examining the nature of Uber’s legal strategies and the technologies that 
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underpin the company’s system of worker administration, these scholars have shed light on two 
major facets of the company’s overarching strategy to combat regulation. What remains 
under-examined - and what this research aims to account for - is the role that Uber’s attempts at 
curating its corporate identity through driver and public-facing communications play within this 
strategy. While legal arguments and systems of algorithmic management can placate regulators’ 
concerns to a certain degree, they do not do the work of manufacturing consent and support 
amongst Uber’s customers and drivers in the manner that the company’s rhetorical and 
advertising strategies do. Such strategies serve to compliment the company’s legal and 
technological practices by attempting to normalize and legitimize them on a wider societal level. 
It is my hope that the findings of this research will call this normalization and legitimization into 
question through its critical analysis and empirical findings.  
 
7. ​Conclusion 
As my findings and analysis have evidenced, there remain many uncertainties regarding 
the future of TNC driver employment classification in California, particularly with respect to the 
applicability of AB5’s "ABC" test to these workers. Whether the “Protect App Based Drivers 
and Services Act” secures TNCs’ exemption from AB5 or AB5’s "ABC" test finds these 
companies’ drivers to be employees, pivotal questions remain regarding the enforcement of these 
regulations, the impact they may have on wider transportation systems as well as their impact on 
drivers themselves. Uber and its fellow TNCs have already shown the proclivity to challenge 
these laws’ application to their workers through litigation as well as legislation, signaling that 
this dispute will not be decided quickly or easily. What is abundantly clear, however, is that the 
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nature of the driver-TNC relationship in California will not revert to its original form after this 
dispute is settled. In order to ensure that the end result of this dispute is as equitable and 
reflective of drivers’ workplace realities as possible, my first policy recommendation is for the 
State of California to immediately mandate that all algorithms and mathematical models that 
administer and manage structures of labor be made available for regulatory oversight.  
TNCs’ algorithms are currently protected from public view and regulatory oversight by 
intellectual property law, which is administered on the federal level by the Department of 
Commerce and thus can only be changed through congressional action. A mandate of 
algorithmic transparency will accomplish two concurrent goals. First, allowing regulators and 
third party experts to examine the inner mechanisms of these algorithms will work to eliminate 
virtually all uncertainties regarding the extent and nature of control that TNCs enjoy over their 
drivers. Legal protections allow companies like Uber to create so-called “black boxes” around 
their driver dispatch algorithms, which essentially allow them to obscure ​their governing 
principles and the manner(s) by which they administer and manage drivers’ work, revealing ​only 
the end results to those outside the company. This blanket protection has been the root cause of 
the ongoing uncertainties over driver classification, with TNCs simultaneously claiming that 
their drivers are wholly independent actors while refusing to share details regarding their 
dispatch algorithms. Allowing regulators and third party experts access to TNCs dispatch 
algorithms in their entirety is the only way that TNCs can be judged by AB5’s "ABC" test with 
full certainty. Without such access, TNCs retain the plausible deniability that their dispatch 
algorithms do not unduly constrain the actions of their drivers and regulators are forced to 
enforce employment law through guesswork and speculation. 
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The second goal that mandating algorithmic transparency would accomplish is less case 
specific and holds primarily long term implications. Such a policy would provide the impetus for 
a more comprehensive apparatus to regulate the design and function of all algorithms that 
administer and manage labor. In other words, once more is learned about these algorithms’ 
inner-workings, regulatory bodies can then begin to identify any structural features of these 
algorithms that might allow violations of established labor law including discriminatory 
practices, illegal working conditions and wage theft. Despite the severe nature of this policy, it is 
not without precedent. For decades, taxi companies operated under heavy regulation that 
systematized their fare structure, qualifications for drivers and even the number of cars legally 
allowed to operate in a locality at a given time. Though such regulations likely hamstrung 
individual taxi companies’ profitability and their owners’ autonomy to a certain degree, they 
were not without their benefits. Holding drivers to a common standard of background checks and 
behind-the-wheel competency decided by impartial third parties ensures a favorable and uniform 
level of service. Limits to the number of taxis in a given locality allowed drivers stable and 
adequate earnings. Uniform fare structures not only eliminated guesswork from customers’ 
perspective, but was inherently more transparent than algorithmically-generated pricing. 
Exposing TNCs to similar regulations, especially if they are decided upon in a manner that 
welcomes ​drivers, regulators and advocates’ input​, would serve to democratize a system that has 
until now been unilaterally controlled by TNCs’ executives and board members. 
In the absence of federally-mandated algorithmic transparency and oversight, there 
remain ways by which state governments can empower municipalities to regulate the actions of 
TNCs within their jurisdictions. This process has already begun in California, as one of AB5’s 
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provisions grants the City Attorneys of California’s “big four” municipalities - San Francisco, 
San Jose, Los Angeles and San Diego - power to sue over allegations of TNC worker 
misclassification within their respective jurisdictions (Bhuiyan 2019). This provision of AB5 is a 
step toward a more democratic regulatory structure, as all four cities’ attorneys are elected by 
constituents rather than appointed by their respective mayors and thus more beholden to public 
scrutiny and pressure. This step is insufficient, however,  because it leaves the decision of 
whether or not to regulate up to the discretion of one person, and many city attorneys have been 
noncommittal regarding their willingness to harness this newfound power (Bollag 2019). 
From 2013 until AB5’s passage in September 2019, the California Public Utilities 
Commission, or CPUC, was the sole regulatory authority over TNCs in California. The CPUC is 
a considerably flawed regulatory body, as its Board of Commissioners consists of only five 
members who are appointed by the Governor rather than elected by constituents and are charged 
with overseeing the (“Commissioners” 2020). These features do now endow the CPUC with the 
level of capacity to adequately oversee the operations of such a dynamic industry in a state as 
large and diverse as California, where transportation conditions can vary significantly from city 
to city and county to county. To be sure, the fact that the CPUC Commission currently serves at 
the behest of Governor Gavin Newsom, who has thus far proven dedicated to combating worker 
misclassification and reigning in TNCs’ actions, is cause for cautious optimism regarding the 
CPUC’s willingness and capacity to regulate going forward (Newsom 2019). The appointed 
nature of this commission, however, makes its mission and level of empowerment largely up to 
the discretion of future Governors who may guide the commission’s actions and agenda in 




The CPUC’s inadequacy as a regulatory body coupled with the promising start afforded 
by AB5’s empowerment of city attorneys brings me to my second policy recommendation, 
which is to further shift regulatory authority over TNCs in California from the state to the local 
level. The least drastic element of such a shift would be the empowerment of the “big four” 
municipalities’ respective offices of labor standards to assist their city attorneys’ TNC worker 
classification suits. Although the city attorneys of these cities undoubtedly have ample and 
capable staffs of their own, they do not likely have the same level of expertise on 
employment-related matters as their counterparts in the offices of labor standards. I propose not 
for the offices of labor standards to take this responsibility from city attorneys altogether, but 
rather for the two bodies to collaborate in the interest of expanding the municipality’s overall 
capacity in handling such issues, which stand to be rather complicated and intensive given the 
secretive and decentralized nature of TNCs’ operations. Offices of labor standards would be 
especially helpful in the investigatory and enforcement aspects of oversight, as this is already a 
large part of their standard operations. To be sure, robust formal channels of communication 
between city attorneys offices and offices of labor standards must be established for such a 
collaboration to be successful, and the offices of labor standards would need to increase their 
staffing levels to accommodate for this new responsibility while retaining the capacity to 
perform their pre-existing duties. 
The more extreme and likely controversial aspect of this shift would be the empowerment 
of the “big four” municipalities’ transportation agencies to regulate TNCs’ operations within 
their jurisdictions. Until this point, these agencies have been forced to design and administer 
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their programs with only estimates of how TNCs’ presence in their city would factor into such 
plans. A large TNC presence in a city has been found to significantly alter traffic patterns as well 
as public transit and taxi usage, making the access to data regarding TNCs’ own operational 
patterns vital to the design of a cohesive and efficient city-wide transportation system (Clelow 
and Mishla 2018, 5; Bliss 2019). This empowerment, however, would largely depend on the 
ability of municipal governments to access such data, which has traditionally been met with stiff 
opposition from TNCs.  
Although TNCs must submit reports on the identities of drivers, the number of accessible 
vehicles in operation, “problems with drivers” and each driver’s total hours and miles driven to 
the CPUC annually, the CPUC is not required and has been unwilling to share such data with 
individual municipalities (“Required Reports” 2020). This is counterproductive, as municipal 
transportation agencies not only tend to be more attuned to the specific needs and realities of 
their jurisdictions’ transportation system than state-level bodies like the CPUC, but have the 
legal capability to alter such systems as well. In the current regulatory environment, the data 
supplied to the CPUC is being under-utilized and would be far more impactful in terms of 
improving California’s urban transportation systems if municipal transportation agencies were 
allowed access to it. A similar logic applies to the data collected by the CPUC regarding the 
miles driven and hours worked by each TNC driver in the state. Though the CPUC has access to 
such valuable data, which could serve to help solve driver misclassification claims or other 
employment-related disputes, the fact that the it is unwilling and unrequired to share this data 
with the entities that have the capability to enforce California’s labor laws, like city attorneys and 
offices of labor standards, renders the data virtually useless.  
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Essentially, the efficacy of such a shift from state to municipal level TNC regulatory 
oversight is dependent on municipalities’ ability to access the data currently held by the CPUC 
and use it to inform their regulatory decision making. Altering TNCs’ reporting requirements so 
that municipal transportation agencies and offices of labor standards rather than the CPUC 
receive this crucial data would be a crucial first step toward establishing a more proactive, 
empowered and detail-oriented regulatory environment for TNCs in California. This data, 
however, is merely the output produced by the various features and mechanisms within TNCs’ 
dispatch algorithms, which ultimately hold the key to proper driver classification and municipal 
transportation planning. Comprehensive regulatory power over TNCs would entail both 
oversight of TNC dispatch algorithms and municipal government access to the data produced by 
those algorithmically made decisions. To be sure, many of the less densely populated areas of the 
state may lack the governmental capacity to adequately carry out such regulatory responsibilities 
on the municipal level. However, such areas also tend to have less complex transportation needs 
and a considerably smaller TNC presence than their urban counterparts. For such areas, I 
recommend TNC oversight be administered on the county rather than municipal level, so as to 
expand regulatory capacity and diffuse costs. 
Ultimately, the rise of Uber and TNCs as a whole represent what I believe to be an 
overcorrection from a centrally-regulated and administered taxi system that, despite its flaws, 
ensured stability for company owners and drivers alike to a TNC system that leaves the 
well-being of both drivers and customers to the discretion of a small number of immensely 
powerful, unaccountable and amoral corporations. Processes that were once subject to 
wide-ranging scrutiny and regulation have been co-opted and completely obscured by private 
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entities who’ve repurposed them in pursuit of revenue and growth maximization. To be sure, 
TNCs have pursued this goal largely through the prioritization of rider convenience, which has 
created a system that is markedly more user-friendly from a consumer perspective. However, a 
number of other considerations - from the economic stability of workers to the safety of riders 
and drivers alike - have been systematically suppressed by these companies. Re-orienting the 
TNC industry to properly value goals other than growing individual companies’ revenue will 
require regulators and lawmakers to make difficult, likely unpopular, but necessary value 
judgments between the importance of preserving the secrecy of corporate intellectual property or 
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Appendix A: Driver Survey 
This past summer, Uber and Lyft sent their California drivers messages regarding AB5, a law 
that could reclassify drivers as employees if it passed. The goal of this survey is to learn your 
thoughts and opinions about these messages, their appropriateness and persuasiveness.  
 
I am a graduate student researcher in the Urban & Public Affairs Program at the University of 
San Francisco. I am part of a cohort of students working on public policy research and I am 
currently conducting a research project that examines drivers’ responses to Uber and Lyfts’ 
sending them messages about schedule flexibility and Assembly Bill 5. This form only applies to 
research subjects who are 18 or older.  
 
I am asking you to participate in a 10 minute long survey about your experience/knowledge of 
urban policy, specifically driving for Uber and/or Lyft. Your participation in this project is 
completely voluntary and you can choose to end the survey at any time, with no repercussions of 
any kind. There are no known risks involved in this study. You will not receive compensation for 
this study. The study is intended to benefit broader public knowledge about this policy topic. 
 
Protecting your identity: Your responses will be used to support research on drivers’ responses to 
Uber and Lyfts’ sending them messages about schedule flexibility and Assembly Bill 5 that may 
be shared with the general public. Any and all information collected that reflects your identity 
(name, title, place of work, etc) will be kept strictly confidential. 
 





All records from this research will be maintained by the researcher in a confidential location on 
the USF campus, with guidance from my faculty sponsors. If you have any questions, please 







Student researcher contact information: Benjamin Peterson, brpeterson2@usfca.edu. 
(650)703-4148 
UPA Faculty Director Rachel Brahinsky, rbrahinsky@usfca.edu. 415-422-2667. 
USF Office for Research on Human Subjects: irbphs@usfca.edu. 
 
 




Question 2: If you would be willing to participate in an interview, please share your preferred 
contact information below (short free response- optional) 
 
Section 2: Demographics 









Question 3: Please state your ethnicity/s (short free response - optional) 
Question 4: What gender do you identify as? 
● Male 
● Female  
● Gender Non-Conforming 
● Prefer not to say 
Question 5: What companies do you work for? (check all that apply) 
● Uber 
● Lyft  
● Private Black Car Service 
● Other  
Question 6: How long have you worked for Uber and/or Lyft? 
● Less than 6 months 
● 6 months-1 year 
● 1-2 years 
● 2-3 years 
● More than 3 year 
 
Question 6: How many hours per week do you drive for these companies? 
● 0-10 hours 
● 10-20 hours 
● 20-30 hours 
● 30-40 hours 
● More than 40 hours 
Question 7: Is driving your main source of income?  
● Yes 
● No 
Question 8: Do you remember Uber or Lyft sending you messages about “protecting driver 





*Those who answered “Yes” to question 8 proceeded to section 3, while those who answered 
“No” skipped section 3 and proceeded to section 4*  
 
Section 3: Messaging 
Question 9: Where did you receive these messages? (check all that apply) 
 
● My Uber/Lyft driver app 
● Email 
● Text Message 
● Other 






● Not Sure 
Question 11: Did any of these messages ask you to sign a petition? 
● Yes 
● No  
● Not Sure 
Question 12: What did you think these messages were about when you first saw them? (short 
free response) 
Question 13: How clear was it that these messages were about a specific law? (sliding scale 1-5: 
1 being very unclear, 5 being very clear) 




● No  
● It Depends 
Question 15: Have Uber or Lyft ever offered you money to attend a protest? 
● Yes  
● No  
● Not Sure 
 
Question 16: How much did these messages impact your opinion on schedule flexibility? (sliding 
scale 1-5: 1 being very little impact, 5 being a significant impact) 
 
Section 4: Appropriateness 
Question 17: In general, do you think it is appropriate for companies to send their workers 
messages about politics? 
● Yes 
● No  
● Only if it’s relevant to their job 
● Only if it impacts the company as a 
whole 
Question 18: If an employer sent you messages about politics, would you feel pressure to agree 
with their point of view? 
● Yes  
● No  




Section 5: Opinions on Assembly Bill 5 
Question 19: What parts of your work do you think will be impacted if you’re classified as an 
employee? (check all that apply) 
● Rate of pay 
● Schedule flexibility 
● Access to benefits 
● Ability to voice your concerns, 
desires and needs 
● Other  
Question 20: Would you rather be classified as an independent contractor or employee? 
● Independent contractor 
● Employee 





















Appendix B: “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” Testimonial Analysis 
  
Theme Number of Mentions Percent of Total 
flexibility for family 
responsibilities 34 47.89% 





flexibility as most 
important/only reason this 
person drives 5 7.04% 
retirement 11 15.49% 
lack of other job opportunities 5 7.04% 
disability/physical toll of other 
jobs unsuitable 11 15.49% 
"extra cash" 12 16.90% 
money for essentials 
(rent/food/etc) 12 16.90% 
high cost of living 6 8.45% 
money for specific 
non-essential goal/purpose 2 2.82% 
"be my own boss" 6 8.45% 
"right to work" 2 2.82% 
mention of 
leisure/lifestyle/desire to work 
at will 7 9.86% 
full time driver 4 5.63% 
part time driver 17 23.94% 
mentions 
social/personal/non-econ 
benefits 2 2.82% 
